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TOPIC: Role of corporate governance in financial institutions.  
      
ABSTRACT 
The Role of Corporate Governance in Financial Institutions is the fulcrum on which 
this research work revolves. Corporate Governance entails that those at the helm of 
company’s affairs such as directors are accountable, responsible and sensitive to the 
stake of shareholders in the Organization, creditors, the entire public and the society, 
which is in fact, quite fundamental to any company.  I will be considering one 
pertinent geographical region in this research which is Ireland and will be dividing 
my research into five chapters: Chapter one will describe the preliminaries such as 
the background of the study, statement of the problem, statement of hypothesis, the 
aims and objectives, scope and limitation of my research. The basis of the 
aforementioned chapter is to lay a proper foundation for my research work whilst I 
will review myriads of relevant literatures in Chapter two and these literatures will 
be reviewed under conceptual, empirical and theoretical frameworks. The rationale 
of review of the literatures is to decipher the gap in these literatures and how my 
research will fill in the identified gaps. In Chapter three, I will examine the 
appropriate research methodology that is apt for my research and will also identify 
the appropriate research design, population of the study, sample size, sampling 
technique and method of data collection and analysis.  
The gravamen of chapter three is to decipher the appropriate methodology that will 
be apt for this research. However, in Chapter four of this research, data collected 
from the field will be presented and analysed and appropriate findings stated. The 
nitty-gritty of Chapter four is to present and analyse the raw data gotten from the 
field in order to make a logical finding. The final chapter, which will be Chapter 
five, will conclude my research with recommendation, contribution to knowledge 
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    CHAPTER ONE. 
1.1 Introduction. 
The reason for this topic is based on the passion for finding feasible means in ending 
bank crisis and protecting depositors and investors in the Banking Industry. It is on 
the premise of my quest of finding feasible means of protecting depositors and 
investors, that this dissertation entails ‘Appraising the roles of corporate governance 
in financial institutions and this research will concentrate more in assessing the effect 
of corporate governance in Ireland. There would be a thorough research in this work 
to demystify the thorny roles corporate governance plays in financial institutions 
because of the vulnerability of financial institutions and that of stakeholders of 
financial institutions.  
Corporate governance entails the means through which commercial activities of a 
corporate entity are operated to enable companies perform their requisite operations 
and ensure the protection of the investment of the shareholders. (Clarke, 1993). The 
nitty-gritty of corporate governance, according to Vintila, is to limit to the barest 
minimum, the ineffectual posture of board of directors towards the activities and 
operations of an organization and principally protect the interest of shareholders in 
the organization (Vintila and Gherghina, 2012). 
According to Garuba and Otemowo (2015), the gravamen of corporate governance 
posits in its entirety that: the board of directors on whom the management functions 
of any organization revolves are obliged to act in the best interest of the shareholders 
and the organization and also ought to take decisions for the improvement of the 
organization to which they owe their allegiance.  
Furthermore, corporate governance equally entails that those at the helm of 
company’s affairs such as directors are:  
• Accountable, 
• Responsible and sensitive to the stakeholders in the organization, 
• Creditors, 
• The entire public and the society which is quite fundamental to any company. 
(Bhadmus 2009, P.127).  
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It is apposite to state that Legitimacy is the fulcrum on which corporate governance 
gravitates. Legitimacy is pertinent to corporate governance because it elucidates the 
pertinence of the functions of management Board of Directors, charter of the 
corporate entity, shareholders, etc. However, a corporate identity is said to be 
legitimate when their activities coincides with their values and goals within which 
the corporate entity operates (Ilesanmi and Kamaludeen, 2012).  
On the other polarity, financial institutions entail those companies that provide 
financial services and it is vital to mention that some of the recognised types of 
financial institutions are investment firms, financial intermediaries and asset 
managers (Bozzi, Modgliani and Jones, 2014) However, in order to understand the 
aforementioned types of financial institutions, it is important to have a peripheral 
assessment of the types of financial institutions already mentioned.  
Gary and Andrew (2002) aver that financial intermediaries are organizations that 
borrow from consumers and lend to corporate entities that requires such loan for 
investment purposes. It can also be put in range of firms that coordinates financial 
transactions between two parties and some examples of these institutions are: 
Insurance Companies, Pension Funds and Commercial Banks.  
Furthermore, Investment firms provide broker-dealer functions which propose an 
exchange of assets mainly monetary for the benefit of the customers and this many 
also include underwriting which means they help their clients in creating financial 
assets, which their clients offer to market participants (Gary and Andrew).  
According to Levine (1997), Asset managers are quite instrumental in giving advice 
to those that are participating in financial market and that are interested in investing 
their capital in financial institutions, pension funds and insurance companies. Asset 
managers equally manage the assets of these market participants. 
Finally, in recent times, there have been myriads of failure of corporate entities 
including financial institutions and which has been hinged on lack of enthronement 
to practice good corporate governance by the Board of Directors of most these 
corporate entities and equally does not auger well with those that invested their 
fortune in these corporate entities and which has led in recent times to evaluate the 
mechanism to be safely practiced and make certain advancement of good corporate 
governance (Alexander and Duhmale, 2001). 
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1.2 Critical Appraisal of Background of the study 
The term Corporate Governance was first employed 40 years ago and the word 
governance was from the Latin word ‘Gubarnare’ and ‘gubarnator’ and which 
relates to ‘Gubarnare’ refers to steering a ship while ‘Gubarnator’ relates to captain 
of the ship. Corporate governance in a nutshell is a mechanism that checkmates the 
arbitrariness of the managers that are controlling a corporate entity. (Okene, Chinwo 
and Ikeh, 2010). 
Corporate governance involves the strategies of improving the processes and 
structure of governance in a corporate entity which aids in guaranteeing exceptional 
decision making, effective succession planning for senior management and quality 
long term fortune for the organization. (Ogbuanya, 2014, P.328). 
The vital force of any corporate entity is largely contingent on the sagacity, 
perspicacity and managerial potentials of the managers of such corporate 
organization. The individual requirements of a manager are, therefore, corporate 
governance basis. However, the rational is premised on the acknowledgement of a 
group interest which desire to be protected and expanded on the one hand and the 
members of other group, which are bequeathed with duties and powers of protecting 
and explaining such other group’s interest (Ongore, 2011). 
Globally, the 2008 Financial crisis catalysed the need for the advancement of good 
corporate governance and in most countries classified as third world countries; the 
concept of corporate governance have become a keen area of interest for some 
investors that may wish to invest their money in any commercial activity of interest. 
Also there are other basic issues that arises in corporate governance and which often 
creates conflict such as: making decisions that will affect the corporate entity by the 
board of directors, there are bound to be conflict of interest, such as making 
decisions that will positively protect the stake or interest of the investors at the 
expense of their remuneration, allowances and other benefits and vice versa (Truman 
and Fatima, 2010). 
Also, survival and growth of any corporate entity, financial institutions inclusive and 
the pertinent need to protect the stake of the investors in any organization presents 
requisite need for an in-depth research in demystifying the corporate governance and 
it is indisputable that the concept of corporate governance is one of the critical and 
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pertinent concept in the commercial world in recent times. (Ilesanmi and 
Kamaludeen, 2012)  
Corporate governance is a very important concept in any corporate establishment 
that it has been viewed by some authors as an invaluable tool for reducing 
destruction of any corporate entity’s value caused primarily by conflict of interest 
among the corporate entity’s stakeholders. Notably, because of the importance of 
corporate governance, it has taken prevalence in every government economic 
discussions, by some governments providing these corporate entities with Codes and 
Guidelines of corporate governance in order for the regulators of these financial 
institutions to bridle the unbridled powers of the management of these corporate 
entities (Adebola, 2009).  
However, the issue of corporate governance became tensed due to the verifiable 
corporate rashes of some famous firms like WorldCom, Satyam and Enron and it 
was observed from investigation, that the collapse of these corporate firms was due 
to some unethical conducts of those at the helm of affairs of the aforementioned 
companies (Aggarwal, 2013). Amidst the pandemic going on currently in the world, 
Thiru Pillay, the managing director for Deloitte Africa’s advisory arm and Shamal 
Sivasanker, Deloitte Africa’s leader on infrastructure resigned recently in the wake 
of a scandal.  
On corporate governance in financial institutions, United Nation Conference on 
Trade and Development (UNTAD 2011) posit that the reform of financial 
institutions by the financial regulators entails ensuring corporate governance reform 
which will equally enhance the commitment of the management of financial 
institutions to the objectives of the corporate firms.  
Khan (2014) postulated that the Central Bank of Ireland toed the path of the United 
Kingdom Combined Codes in order to ensure good corporate governance in Ireland 
and it initiated the Corporate Governance for Credit Institutions and Insurance 
undertakings in 2010. The Code is mainly for financial organizations and it has 
statutory flavour. The Code centres majorly on qualifications, composition and 
commitments of the board members.   
Also, in Ireland, in general terms, the regime on corporate governance has been 
classified as an open one in so much that corporate entities ownership, bank 
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inclusive are separated independently between the investors which are the 
shareholders and the management alignment of interests through stock market based 
compensation (La Porta et al, 1998). 
Also, the Combined Code of 2003 contains vital points as proffered by the Higgs 
Report of 2003 in relation to basic principles as corporate governance, the functions 
of the Board and chairman and the payment of committees and non-executive 
directors.  
Finally, it is imperative not to mention that the concept of corporate governance 
revolves mainly on the division of the control of any corporate entity between the 
management, who are the directors and the investors and who are the shareholders 
(Gerrard, Clarke and Ruchira, 2010).  
1.3 Statement of the Problem 
The current events of financial instability have underscored the probable fragility of 
financial institutions and the effect of such financial instability on the economy of a 
nation. However based on the aforementioned, there have been serios investigations 
to decipher the causes of such financial misfortune and to decipher feasible means of 
curbing and ameliorating the causes of these financial crisis (Common wealth in 
Corporate Governance in the Financial Sector, 2000). 
In recent times, financial organisations are constantly increasing in their abilities and 
inspirations, however poor enthronement of good corporate governance in these 
increasing organizations by those at the helm of management, has drastically 
affected the economies of financial entities and these have led to most of the 
shareholders of these financial entities that have invested a good amount of their 
fortune in these financial entities to be losing interest in the activities of these 
financial organizations (Yusoff and Idris, 2012).  
Nevertheless, financial institutions seem to be the most vulnerable of poor corporate 
governance. There have been myriads of research in this area of study prior to 2007-
2008 financial crises and yet the crises happened. The nexus between management 
of banks, the mechanism to put in place to prevent bank crisis and ensuring 
wholesome operational performance of banks, remain elusive and yet to be 
demystified. There are, however, some potential suspects of these financial crisis, 
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which are: excessive borrowing, transparency issues among the management and 
credit-default swaps in the financial institution and all aforementioned causes of 
financial crisis are caused by poor management by those at the helm of affairs of 
these financial institutions and which invariably connects principally to poor 
corporate governance (Angelides et al., 2011). 
Furthermore, flowing from the above observation by Angelides, the basis for the 
need for robust research in corporate governance is that most of the notable financial 
crisis of corporate entities, financial institutions inclusive that have happened in the 
past were not incidental but were pitfalls of some person, on whom the management 
functions revolve and for every failure of any financial institution, there is some 
vestige of paucity of motivation or encouragement among the management of the 
financial institutions, the investors, regulators and creditors. Corporate governance 
over the years has demonstrated to be a vital tool in deciphering the underlying 
issues hampering the success of any corporate entity, where there is divergence of 
encouragement and unity of purpose, which is capable of leading to the failure of the 
firm (Mehran and Mollineaux, 2012). 
Specifically, in relation to banks there are verifiable suspicions that poor corporate 
governance system among banks, most especially the larger banks, have proven to be 
one of the visible causes of financial crisis in most of these banks. (Mehran and 
Mollineaux, 20102). 
 
1.4 Research Questions 
There are pertinent questions posed by this research work and they are as follows: 
i. What are the roles of corporate governance in financial institutions? 
ii. What are the underlying causes of poor corporate governance in financial 
institutions? 
iii. What re the roles of board of directors in guaranteeing good corporate 
governance in financial institutions? 
iv. What are the practicable ways the interest of shareholders of financial 
institutions can be protected through good corporate governance? 
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v. What are the feasible ways staff of financial institutions can aid in 
guaranteeing good corporate governance in financial institutions? And 
vi. How does the concept of corporate governance positively and negatively 
affect the customers of financial institutions? 
vii. What are the cogent mechanism that can be put in place by regulators of a 
financial institution such as banks in ensuring adequate corporate 
governance?  
1.5 Aims and Objectives of the study 
The aim of this research is assessing the role of corporate governance in financial 
institutions and identifying the impact of good corporate governance on financial 
institutions. Some of the objectives of this project are: 
i. To decipher the roles of corporate governance in financial institutions. 
ii. To identify the underlying causes of poor corporate governance in financial 
institutions.  
iii. To deduce the roles of board of directors in guaranteeing good corporate 
governance in financial institutions.  
iv. To identify how the interest of the shareholders of financial institutions can 
be protected. 
v. To deduce how the staff of financial institutions can aid in guaranteeing that 
they provide good corporate governance. 
vi. To appraise how corporate governance concept, affect positively and 
negatively to customers of financial institutions.  
vii. To identify cogent mechanisms to be put in place by regulators of financial 
institutions such as banks in ensuring good corporate governance. 
1.6 Statement of Hypothesis 
The following statement of hypothesis will be tested using statistical models in 
subsequent chapters and for the purpose of this study, it is hypothesis that: 
Ho1: Corporate Governance affects the success or failure of business operations of 
financial institutions in Ireland. 
Ho2: Corporate Governance does not affect the success or failure of business 
operations of financial institutions in Ireland. 
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1.7  Scope and Limitation of study 
This research will be limited geographically to Ireland and will have a critical 
appraisal of some relevant literatures on corporate governance and financial 
institutions. Financial institution in my research is mainly within commercial banks.  
However, like any other research work, this research work suffered some coherent 
limitations; some of these limitations are: limited number of relevant books in this 
topic, poor keeping of vital public documents as it relates to this topic, as most of 
these documents are not readily available in the school library, financial constraints, 
movement restrictions and temporary closure of banks due to the COVID-19 
outbreak and ultimately, the time frame within which this research was carried out 
was too short for a perfect work because the study was carried out alongside other 
strenuous academic work in school. 
 
1.8 Significance of study 
There have been verifiable reports of poor corporate governance in financial 
institutions especially in the area of financial reporting among banks and which has 
not augured well with the banking operations of these banks. An example of poor 
corporate governance in the booking sector, is earning management which decreases 
the reliability of information from financial statement of a corporate entity and 
cooking the books, which entails falsifying the financial statement (Schipper, 1989). 
The significance or justifications of this research lies in the issue that if this research 
work succeeds in unravelling the causes of poor corporate governance in financial 
institutions especially in Ireland and proffer a feasible solution thereto, then this 
research will be adjudged to have impacted positively and immensely to the 
corporate world as regards to financial institutions.  
This research will be invaluable to board of directors, shareholders, staff and 
customers that patronise financial institutions like commercial banks generally.  
In addition, this research will equally be helpful to other researchers that want to toe 




1.9 Chapter Synopsis 
This research is divided into five chapters and the reason is for proper understanding 
and appreciation of the entire gamut of this work.  
Chapter one, like any other research deals on preliminaries such as: introduction, 
background of the study, statement of the problem, research questions, scope and 
limitations, significance of the study and synopsis of chapter and the basis of this 
chapter is to lay a proper foundation for this research.  
Furthermore, chapter two deals primarily on review of related literatures. This 
chapter contains the conceptual, empirical and theoretical framework. The nitty-
gritty of this chapter is to decipher the importance of these literatures of this research 
and the gaps observed from the reviewed literatures which this research intends to 
fill.  
Nevertheless. Chapter three deals on research methodology of this research and 
entails the design used in the research, the area of study, the population of the study, 
sample size and sampling techniques, method of data collection, method of data 
analysis and justification of the method used. The gravamen of this chapter aims to 
x-ray the methodology adopted in demystifying this work. 
Chapter four deals on data presentation and analysis which entails the following: 
analysis and data protection, discussion of findings, test of hypothesis and summary 
of findings. The rationale of this chapter is to portray and analyse the raw data 
collected from the field and equally present the identified findings.  
Finally, chapter five generally concludes the research. This chapter entails the 
summary, observations, recommendations, contribution to knowledge, suggested 
areas for further studies, etc. The basis of this chapter is to summarize and generally 







      CHAPTER TWO. 
           LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Introduction 
I will review pertinent and relevant literatures in this chapter. It is germane to state 
that the purpose of literature review in this research is to appraise previous 
researches that are quite relevant to the objectives of this research work, in order to 
aid in designing an apt conceptual framework. The reviewed literatures covers 
myriads of topics and which prompted the researcher to identify three main topics 
that will serve as prime focus in this review, which are: Concept of Corporate 
Governance, Financial Institutions, Assessing the nexus between corporate 
governance and financial institutions and history of corporate governance. Also, the 
conceptual, empirical and theoretical frameworks of this research were equally 
considered.  
2.2 Literature Review Strategy 
In order to show authenticity and reliability of the review of previous literatures, it is 
apposite the researcher specifies its literature review strategy. The researcher made 
use of data base such as Science Direct, Pro Quest, World Cat, West Law. Hein, 
Sage Journals and Academic search engine. Also, I equally made use of Bing and 
Google Scholar and the gravamen for the use of these search engines is to identify 
peer-reviewed literatures. The path toed by the researcher in identifying these peer-
reviewed literatures is the use of relevant key words such as: Corporate Governance, 
Financial Institution, Corporate Governance Codes, Poor corporate governance, etc.  
Furthermore, due to paucity of recent materials in the area of this research, the search 
concentrated more on peer-reviewed articles, e-books and journals of less than 
twenty years (20) on the Roles of Corporate Governance in Financial Institutions. 
Though e-books, articles and journals of more than twenty years were sparsely used.  
2.3 Review of Previous Literatures 
2.3.1 Concept of Corporate Governance 
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Mamta et al (2012) states that corporate governance is a term that  pervades the 
business world in recent times and can either be good or poor in any organization 
and that good corporate governance which every organization ought to strive to 
achieve entails ‘intellectual honesty’ and is not within the precincts of keeping to 
rules and regulations and organizations that practice such corporate governance are 
always successful. According to Humera (2011), corporate governance encompasses 
the rules, regulations, policies and institutions that superintend the activities of a 
corporate entity. 
   
Mudashiru and Bakare (2014) are of the opinion that Corporate Governance is a 
corporate structure that allocates or apportions duties and responsibilities to 
stakeholders in a corporate entity and Adeusi et al avers that corporate governance 
entails the means by which commercial activities of a corporate entity, through its 
management are governed; it equally entails a set of principles and regulation 
through which the firm’s management is governed and controlled.  
Patrick and Kirk (2009) views corporate governance as the means, which investors 
in any business enterprise through the board of directors do get a return on their 
investment. 
Zulkufly and Hafiz are of the opinion that Corporate Governance, encompasses an 
internal and external structure aimed at reducing the agency risk by increasing the 
monitoring of the actions of those at the helm of affairs of the corporate entity, 
certain selfish behaviours of the management and generally improving the quality of 
the firm.   
Ferrari (2017) portrays that corporate governance encompasses the structure through 
which the objectives of the company are mapped out and feasible means of 
achieving the stated objective, through the concerted aid of the stakeholders in the 
going business concern.   
Corporate governance entails in its entirety, an internal arrangement, in which a 
corporate entity including Financial Institutions like banks are managed. Corporate 
Governance creates a structure which stipulates duties and diverse roles of 
stakeholders in an organization in order to achieve the desired objective of the 




Mahtab and Abdullahi posit, that Corporate Governance particularly entails, that all 
parties concerned with the smooth operation of a company, such as a financial 
institution like shareholders, ensure that those at the helm of management of the 
company, are putting in concrete mechanism in steering the affairs of the 
organization, the interest of the shareholders. 
Le Quang et al (2014) citing World Bank (1999) posit that the term Corporate 
Governance includes both Internal and External arrangement, in which both the 
internal and external stakeholders work for the attainment  of the organization 
objective: Internal Stakeholders  include the Board of Directors and Shareholders 
while external stakeholders are Creditors, Suppliers. etc 
Rongli Yuan (2005) avers that Corporate Governance relates to a reaction to agency 
issues that arise from the division of management and ownership of a Corporation  
Brennan (2014) posits that corporate governance entails confirmed market and 
organized procedure that cause self-interested managers to utilize the amount of the 
unused cash flows of the organization on behalf of the shareholders of the 
organization.     
 
Corporate governance involves the structure in which powers, responsibilities and 
functions are allocated in an organization and this includes directing, supervising and 
managing the organization. It also includes how those at the helm of management of 
the organization are held accountable to the shareholders, that invested in the 
organization and that sought to protect their investment. Also, good corporate 
governance radically promotes the way an organization operates by ensuring that the 
management and investors in the organization tare encouraged in order to encourage 
efficiency and investment returns (Omankhanln et al 2013). 
 2.3.2 Financial Institutions 
F. Fabozzi et al (2014) posits that financial institutions are enterprises, whose core 
mandate, is the provision of financial services such as: processing of economic 
transactions for members of the public, insurance services, taking deposits from 
members of the public, management of assets for interested public. Examples of 




Christina, Yan and Jinz (2000) states that financial institutions are companies whose 
primary roles are accepting deposits from the public, giving loans to eligible 
members of the public and exchange of currencies and offering investment advice.  
 
Financial Institutions are those firms that are within the precincts of finance and 
examples of these financial institutions are Investment companies, companies that 
are involve in Insurance activities, Banks: Commercial Banks, Mortgage banks etc 
and firms involve in giving investment advice to clients (Cheng, Hong and 
Schewmah 2013). 
Triole, J. (2006) posits that a financial institution are those institutions that act as a 
link between their clients and the firms that are involved in capital and debt markets.  
2.3.3 Assessing the Nexus between Corporate Governance and 
Financial Institution 
Guido (2017) posits that core objective of Corporate Governance to Financial 
Institutions lies in the fact that the regulators of financial institutions rely on the 
corporate governance of these financial institutions to superintend these financial 
institutions. In a nutshell, most financial regulators demand the directors of these 
financial institutions, as one of their core management functions to ensure that the 
risks in these financial institutions are aptly managed. He further averred that in the 
absence of a good corporate governance, the members of the public that entrust their 
fortune to these financial institutions and investors that invest in these financial will 
not be protected.   
Adeoye (2015) comparing corporate governance in financial Institutions and non- 
financial institutions, posited that though corporate governance in non-financial 
institutions is imperative, but that of financial institution is of peculiar and distinctive 
importance, because of the vital roles of financial institutions in commercial 
activities and the vulnerability of the customers of these financial institutions. 
It is apposite to reiterate  the words of Mehran and Mollineaux (2012) where the duo  
posited that the rationale behind a  robust research in corporate governance in 
financial institutions is that most of the notable financial crisis of corporate entities, 
financial institutions inclusive  that have happened in the past were not incidental but 
were pitfalls of some persons, on whom the management functions revolves and for 
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every failure of any financial institution , there is some vestige of paucity of 
motivation or encouragement among the management of the financial institutions, 
the investors, regulators and creditors. Corporate governance over the years has 
demonstrated to be a vital tool in deciphering the underlying issues hampering the 
success of any corporate entity, where there is divergence of encouragement and 
unity of purpose, which is capable of leading to the failure of the firm. 
Alexander and Dhumale (2001) viewing the importance of corporate governance on 
financial institution from the legal stand-point state that the consideration of certain 
legal factors is apt in viewing ways to determine the importance of corporate 
governance in financial institutions. For instance stipulating certain corporate 
governance guidelines that will govern the management actions and decisions by the 
regulators of the financial institutions, the implementation of contracts and other 
feasible laws that ensures protection of the interest of stakeholders in financial 
institution for a better service delivery of the financial institutions. 
 
In the United Kingdom and Europe as whole, Kern Alexander (2004) confirms that a 
robust research on corporate governance in financial institutions has been ignored, 
the focus of myriads of researchers has always been on non-financial institutions, 
regarding financial institutions as a peculiar area that needs expertise because of the 
high risk related to the area and the susceptibility of the customers involve in these 
financial institutions. 
 
The Common-Wealth Working Group on Corporate Governance in the Financial 
Sector opined that a vital element that has caused financial instability in many 
financial institutions, like bank, is weak corporate governance. Inadequate corporate 
governance in the operations of financial institutions like banks, decreases the ability 
of these financial institutions to detect, manage and track risk and which the 
aforementioned  can skyrocket the risk-taking of the financial institution, which does 
not augur well for the financial institution. Also, weak corporate governance can 
likely lead to insolvency of the bank.  
 
Obu (2012) stated that Corporate governance is quite vital for the administration and 
control of banks. There are two germane angles of which corporate governance may 
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be viewed: the corporate governance task must ensure transparency, which will 
invariably protect the shareholders and secondly an apt mechanism must be put in 
place to ensure risk management.   
Hettes is of the opinion that the supervision of banks cannot be effectively 
implemented if there is absence of ‘correct corporate governance’. The ‘correct 
corporate governance’ affirms the necessity to adequate degree of management, 
responsibility and balance of relevant competencies by those that steer the affairs of 
banks. Strong corporate governance, clarify and reduce the supervision of banks and 
gears towards a coordinated inter-personal relationship between the management and 
banking regulatory agencies.  
 
Uwuigbe (2011), posited that the rationale behind banking supervision, entails that 
corporate governance, should not only serve to protect the stake of the investors, but 
also the interest of the vulnerable public at large.  
Battaglia and Carboni (2018) opined that the supervision of corporate governance in 
financial institutions like banks is apposite, because of the vulnerability of financial 
institutions and the stakeholders and the possibility of causing financial crisis in 
these banks, which is likely to affect the economy in general. The duo equally 
suggested the need for effective regulation in banks to ensure the evil effect of 
inadequate corporate governance is curbed.  
 
John and Taylor (2000) posit that there is a wide discrepancy between Corporate 
Governance in the financial sector to that of Non-Financial sector: financial 
institution especially banks are associated with high level of risk and the regulators 
of these financial institutions are always vigilant with issues relating to corporate 
governance by making rules and stipulating standards  
 
Philip Davies (1995) in comparison with cooperate governance in financial 
institution and non-financial institution, he posited that financial institution like 
bank, if misgoverned may result to bank crisis and which most stakeholders will 
definitely be affected and many will lose the fortunes invested in the bank and this 
makes it imperative for corporate governance in financial institutions to be given top 
priority to non-financial institutions and which it behoves on the board of directors 




Maximillian et al (1999) posited that the long- established approach of corporate 
governance as it relates to financial institution entails those that superintend financial 
institutions are empowered by law to provide corporate governance guidelines, rules 
and standard fort the protection of stakeholders involve these financial institutions. 
 
According to Bonani Dhaka (2015), there is a wide discrepancy between the 
importance of corporate governance in financial institutions and non- financial 
institutions: the failure of corporate governance in financial institutions may have 
severe consequences in financial institutions to non-financial institutions and this 
may be premised on the position of financial institutions, being financial 
intermediaries and the payment system. Financial institutions also depend on 
depositors for survival and this creates so much risk on the part of  financial 
institutions and which ought to put these financial institutions to opt for corporate 
governance that is appropriate in order to guard the interest of the depositors. 
 
Hans- Helmut and Reinhard (2017) are of the opinion that the reason corporate 
governance in Financial Institution is considered to be of vital importance is that: 
financial institutions like bank, hold assets with a maturity radically longer than the 
source of the fund and which are always made available on demand and banks are 
exposed to runs because of maturity mismatch. 
 
The words of David Carse (2000) are quite instructive, in his speech in the 
millennium dinner of the association of international accountant stated that the 
concept of corporate governance is not just apt to banks, but a concept that ought to 
spread to other corporate entities. 
White (2019), stated that in Ireland, banks, Insurance companies and other financial 
institutions are statutorily required to comply with the corporate governance 
requirements as given in 2016, by the Central Bank of Ireland.  In order to ensure the 
observation of good corporate governance, Insurance companies are mandated to 
apply the Corporate Governance Requirements for Insurance Undertakings while 
Banks are equally mandated to apply the Corporate Governance on Credit 




According to Umoh (2002), Corporate governance in the banking sector of any 
country provides the foundation on which the banks achieve its set out business 
objectives and also help in protecting the interest of not just the investors of the 
bank, but all the stakeholders, that have legitimate interest to protect. However, most 
regulatory agencies impose penalties on bank directors, for breaches of the corporate 
governance codes.   
 
 2.3.4 The Evolution of Corporate Governance 
Jovanovic (2016) stated that corporate governance existed as pattern of thinking, 
over so many centuries before the formal use of the term. Corporate governance 
started to evolve at the rudimentary stages of corporate entities, from a business 
conducted by family members, to entrepreneurs and skyrocketed to Multinational 
companies.   
 
Jovanovic (2016), further opined that corporate governance became apparent in the 
eighties of the 20th century and in 21st century and of which the importance of 
corporate governance began to manifest and appreciated. The crux of corporate 
governance from the time of its emergence was codes of desirable behaviour that are 
enforced on corporate entities through-out the world. The Codes of desirable 
behaviour are embedded in the four pillars of: integrity, honesty, openness, and 
responsibility towards the stakeholders that are involved in corporate governance.  
 
Furthermore, the research conducted on evolution of Corporate Governance by 
Saintgits College of Applied Science (2016) provides that the idea of corporate 
governance was emphasized by Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means in their research 
work, ‘The Modern Corporation and Private Property’. However Corporate 
Governance as an area of study was first used in the 1980’s by Bob Tricker. the 
pertinence of corporate governance in the 1990’s, was because of the coherent 
misbehaviour and unethical conduct of those at helm of affairs of corporate entities, 
such as the managers.  Also, the failure of big corporate entities, such as Parmalat in 
Europe, WorldCom, Enron and Global Crossing in the United States in the initial 
stage of 2000’s, trembled the corporate world and raised doubt about the survival of 
big corporations due to paucity of good corporate governance. The failures of these 
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corporations led to strict guidelines and regulations on corporate governance and, 
passing some unique laws such as Sarbanes Oxley Act, in the United States of 
America.  
 
According to Ruparalia and Njuguna (2016), the bedrock of corporate governance 
can be traced to the research work of Berle and Means in 1932. The duo of Berle and 
Means (1932) and as quoted by Ruparalia and Njuguna, stated   that the growth of 
contemporary corporate entities led to the division of the management of these 
corporate entities from ownership of the corporate entity. The aforementioned 
assertion of Berle and Means led to the interest of researchers to identify the 
behaviour dimension of a corporation. Corporate Governance was coined from the 
research work of Chaucer, of which, means being responsible and wise was linked 
with governance and doing what is proper, while the application of governance to 
corporations, was coined form the Latin word gubernare, meaning to steer. 
 
In Ireland, Lynn, Sharma and Clark stated that statutory corporate governance of 
Ireland is historically, Anglo-American model.  The Corporate Governance structure 
is balanced with the Listing rules of the Irish Stock Exchange, which adopts the 
Federal Reporting Council Combined Code of Corporate Governance. 
 
2.4 Conceptual Framework 
Flowing from the research questions as adumbrated in chapter one of this research, 
the conceptual framework of this research is primarily built on Stakeholders theory, 
which was originally propounded by Edward Freeman (1984). The Stakeholders 
theory of corporate governance guides this research on identifying how the roles of 
the actors or stakeholders of corporate governance will enhance efficient corporate 
governance in financial institution. 
The choice of the researcher in adopting the stakeholder’s theory as the basis of the 
conceptual framework of this research is that it provides for an apt evaluation of a 
corporate entity’s performance than any other theory of corporate governance. The 
Stakeholder’s theory has been acknowledged as the crux of all the other corporate 
governance theories (Binh and Anh, 2017). 
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Stakeholder’s theory entails group of persons or person that are or is affected by the 
actualization of an organization’s set objectives. Stakeholder’s theory further entails 
a nexus or connection between the managers of a corporate entity and some 
designated persons, interested in the efficient running of the corporate entity 
(Abdullah and Valentine, 2009). 
 
Furthermore, Ayuso and Argandona (2007), posited that stakeholders of a 
corporation encompasses persons and constituencies that give willingly or 
unwillingly to the capacity, wealth creation and activities of the organization and 
these persons share the prospective risk or benefits in the corporation. A corporation 
is conscious of the groups or constituencies for two main reasons: the interest of 
these groups has intrinsic worth and it behoves on the corporation to protect same 
and addressing the aforementioned interest improves the profitability of the 
corporation.  
However, it is germane to mention that other than the shareholders, there are other 
stakeholders that are relevant to a corporate entity, such as customers, employees, 
government (regulators) etc. (Binh and Anh, 2017). 
 
Yusoff and Alhaji, (2002) opined that the rationale behind the stakeholder’s theory is 
that the efficiency of a firm should not be measured only by the benefits that accrue 
to the shareholders. There are other vital issues that are imperative for consideration, 
such as the inter-personal relationship between the management of the firm and other 
stakeholders such as the customers, employees of the firm, the unhindered flow of 
information from senior management to other staff of lower rank and the efficiency 
of the regulators with supervision of adherence of codes of corporate governance by 
financial institution. 
 
Freeman (1984) posits that Stakeholder’s theory, which necessitates a nexus or 
connection with many group of persons or person, whose interest will be affected by 
the achievement of the corporation’s goals, affects decision making process of the 
corporation. The stakeholder’s theory centers majorly on the decisions of the 
managers of an organization and the stakeholder’s interest, which is taken to have 
intrinsic worth and none of the stakeholder’s interest is taken to override the others. 
27 
 
Progressively, in order to further appreciate the stakeholder’s theory, Rodriguez et al 
(2002) categorized stakeholders into three categories and which are contractual 
stakeholders, con-substantial stakeholders and contextual stakeholders. Con-
substantial stakeholder entails the stakeholders that are fundamental for the corporate 
business survival and which are principally the investors, shareholders and 
employees, example of contractual stakeholders and which there is some vestige of 
contract in their relationship with the firm, are customers. Contextual stakeholders 
include agents of natural and social platform, of which legitimizes the business 
operations of the organization.  
 
Jesen (2001), posit accountability is the fulcrum of which the stake holder theory of 
corporate governance gravitates. The theory states that the successful performance of 
a corporate entity is based on the cordial connection or relationship, the organization 
has with its stakeholders.  
Webb (2004) opined that the under stakeholders’ theory, that the procedure of 
governance, moves away from the principal-agent relationship and tend towards a 
teamwork, which involves co-operation, coordination and conflict resolution 
mechanism, to achieve the highest degree of efficiency.  
Le Quang et al (2014) citing World Bank (1999) posit that the Internal Stakeholders 
include the Board of Directors and Shareholders while external stakeholders are 
Creditors, Suppliers, Customers etc. 
 
Fundamentally, the stakeholder theory of corporate governance is apt for the 
conceptual framework of this research in the sense that it aids in explaining the 
relationship that exist between the two main variables in this research. The two main 
variables in this research are corporate governance and financial institutions. It is 
safe to state at this point, that corporate governance is the Independent variable, 
while financial institution is the dependent variable. The rationale for the 
aforementioned is that corporate governance which primarily entails governance of a 
corporate entity by those that steer the affairs or manage the corporate entity 
influences or changes the fortunes of the corporate entity. Corporate entity in this 




Nevertheless, the survival of the financial institution, being the dependent variable is 
influenced by the managerial dexterity of those at the helm of affairs of the financial 
institution. Those at helm of affairs include all relevant stakeholders that play 
designated roles for the survival of corporate entities. 
Stakeholder’s theory further  explains the relationship that exist between the two 
variables by stating that the coordinated and concerted  roles of some stakeholders, 
such as board of directors, shareholders, employees,  customers and appropriate 
regulators of  a corporate entity, which in this instance is a financial institutional, 
determines to a great extent, the success of the financial institution. The governance 
approach of the board is not considered in isolation in this theory, but it also relates 
to how other interested persons or groups such as the shareholders participate in 
protecting their interest, the inter-personal relationship of the employees with the 
management or the board of directors and lastly the customer’s feedback to the 
financial institution. The relationship of the stakeholders in ensuring good corporate 
governance and curbing the underlying causes of poor cooperate governance in 
financial institution, constitute the rationale for building the conceptual framework 
of this research on stakeholder’s theory.  
 
2.5 Empirical Framework 
Otieno (1991) in a survey done in Nairobi, Kenya on the effect of corporate 
governance in Financial institutions, observed that in order to ensure that 
shareholders and other stakeholders are satisfied in any financial institutions, that 
there ought to be a set-down guideline and standard of corporate governance by the 
regulators of financial institutions in order to provide the premise on which board of 
directors can rely in implementing the duties and responsibilities for the benefit of 
the Financial institution.  Also, Otieno (1991) equally observed the inapplicability of 
a general standard of corporate governance to all Financial, because such application 
may not be in tandem with local economies.    
Also, after a thorough investigation into the 2008 financial crisis, it was discovered 
that the failure of corporate governance in financial institutional like banks, was a 
major factor that led to abysmal financial crisis (Jacques Larosirere, 2009). 
It is apposite to mention that corporate governance is quite apt in financial reporting 
of financial institutions: Klai and Omri (2011) investigated corporate governance and 
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financial reporting of some financial institutions in Tunisia and they used multiple 
regression models  and the result reveals that poor corporate governance affects 
some Tunisian Financial Institutions  and this is caused by lack of  autonomy of the 
board of directors and high rate of ownership concentration and it affected financial 
reporting of Tunisia financial institutions.  
Theodore, Blannaid and Ruchira investigated the concept of Corporate Governance 
in Ireland and posited that the Corporate governance in Ireland, has been categorized 
as an open one, in the sense that ownership of corporation, including banks are 
divided between the investors and the management and  is dispersed in arm’s length 
relationship. 
 
However, on the polarity, as apt as  good corporate governance may seem to 
boosting the economies of financial institutions, it has been deciphered from 
investigation, that good corporate finance is not adequate in preventing failure of 
financial institutions, especially banks, a quintessential instance of the 
aforementioned investigation, is the survey conducted  by Beltratti and Stulz, (2012) 
where the duo measured the causes of bank under performance during the financial 
crisis of 2008, from the sample of 90 banks, that constitute the population, the duo 
found that there was no practicable proof to share that the causes of bank failure 
during the crisis was as a result of poor corporate governance in the banks that 
constituted the population and there was no proof also that the banks during the 
crisis adjudged to have good corporate governance did satisfactorily during the 
crisis. 
 
Also, in considering the performance of banks during the crisis on stock-return and 
the motivation of Chief Executive Officers, it was observed from investigations on 
98 banks, done by Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2010),  that there was no feasible proof 
from the banks investigated that the Chief Executive Officer’s interest that is in 
consonance with that of owners, had greater stock-return during the crisis and that 
banks whose Chief Executive Officer’s interest are in consonance with that of the 
owners underperformed and had pathetic investors return. 
Almost paradoxically, it has been observed by Adamati and Hellwig (2010) that 
good corporate governance; do make the management of Financial Institutions to 
engage in myriads of risk: this is predicted on the fact that most banks loses for 
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example, are being borne by stakeholders while gains are being borne by the 
shareholders and the management, if properly motivated. Adamati and Hellwig 
stated pertinent that it is within the prerogative of the regulators and not necessarily 
corporate governance, to manage the high risk to be borne by the managers and 
investors in order to protect these financial institutions.  
Also, in another development  it has been observed in Poland, that good corporate 
governance is not a quintessential criteria  for the proper functioning of a financial 
institution in terms of its financial performance and financial reporting; an 
investigation conducted by Gruszczynski (2006), on Poland listed companies shows 
that most of  the financial institution’s financial performance and reports, which has 
been adjudged to be apt by the regulators of financial institutions in Poland, weren’t 
products of governance. 
2.6 Theoretical Framework 
This research will appraise some theories that are quite relevant to the topic of this 
research and which those theories are: 
 2.6.1 Stewardship Theory 
The stewardship theory of corporate governance entails that a group of persons in an 
organization designated as the board members are entrusted with the responsibility to 
act for the benefit of the public and to also protect the interest and investment of the 
investors or shareholders of the company; this theory creates an ample structure of 
management and authority and which is quite apt because it provides for a well-
coordinated decisions and improve independent decision making (Garuba A.O., 
2011). 
 2.6.2 Agency Theory 
Another theory worthy of consideration is the agency theory; this theory views the 
shareholders of the corporate entity as the principals and management of the 
corporate entity as their agents. This theory equally shows that agents will always act 
for their interest at the expense of the shareholders that are their principals. However, 
agents being the management of the corporate entity, that are at the helm of affairs of 
the corporation, will always seek to serve their own interest by first guaranteeing 
their remuneration and job security and do no more to also protect the interest of the 
investors or shareholders. The management being the agents in this instance ought to 
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be checkmated to avoid arbitrariness and to ultimately ensure that the interest of the 
shareholders, who are primarily the investors are served. (Declan Reidy, 2011). 
However, in further adumbration, Jensen and Meckling (1976) posit that agency 
theory refers to the management of a corporate entity as agents of the owners of the 
corporate entity and of which such owners are known as the principals. The agents 
are charged not only to act in the interest of the principals, but also in the best 
interest of the principles of the organization.  
 2.6.3 Stakeholders Theory 
Abid et al (2014) posit that Stakeholder Theory in Corporate Governance relates to 
means of identifying and coordinating the stakeholders that are involved in a 
corporate entity; in contrast to agency theory, agency theory is limited and quite 
‘self-serving’ in the sense that it relates primarily to the protection of the interest of 
the shareholders and how returns on their investment will be made  while 
Stakeholders theory relates to the all the stakeholders involve and which is quite all-
encompassing and the theory is quintessential because the stakeholders which are 
obviously many do hold the management accountable which will invariably make 
the management to be cautious in their dealings to when limited number will hold 
the management liable like the shareholders in agency theory. 
 
 2.6.4 Resources Dependency Theory 
Malek Lashgari (2004) on Resources Dependency Theory posit that this theory 
focuses on the resources the directors can make available to the firm for its efficient 
operations and profit purposes; boards of directors in any organization have vital and 
pertinent roles to play in achieving economic efficiency and efficacy in the 
operations of the organization. It is pertinent to state that base on this theory and 
because of the profit maximization and orientation of some organisations, the 
appointment of directors may be premised on some persons that have access to some 
important resources needed by the firm and specialized expertise and dexterity, that 
will aid the firm to prepare for uncertainty by connecting to external resources.  
 2.6.5 Legitimacy Theory 
Suchman M.C (1995) on legitimacy theory stated legitimacy theory is premised on 
the assumption and interpretation that the decisions and acts of a corporation are 
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appealing, suitable and apt with some socially devised worth. Legitimacy theory is 
premised on a coherent social agreement between the society and the corporate 
entity. The rationale behind legitimacy theory in corporate governance is that a 
corporate entity ought to put into consideration, the interest of the public and not just 
the interest of the shareholders that ought to be protected  and failing to comply the 
expectation of the society may lead to severe punishment, which will invariably 
affect the firms operations. 
 
 2.6.6 Transaction Cost Economies Theory 
Also, another theory that is of utmost importance to corporate governance is 
Transaction Cost Economies Theory; this theory focuses more on transaction costs to 
production cost: the theory entails that the management operates under limited 
rationality and they are self-interest seeking. This theory simply shows the selfish 
attitude of the management that acts in their won interest of the shareholders 
(Ghulam Abid eta a, 2014). 
 
 2.6.7 Ethical Theories (Business Ethics and Virtue Theory) 
Nevertheless, other than the above stated theories, there are some ethical theories 
that are associated with corporate governance. These theories that are worth 
considering are Business ethics and Virtue ethics. Business Ethics relates to an 
appraisals of business activities and operations in order to address the rights and 
wrongs. The gravamen for business ethics is the powers businesses exert in any 
given society are legion and the collapse of a business has a major influence on the 
society in relation to jobs, products and services. Business ethics helps to understand 
some paramount ethical issues within the firm and which ought to be addressed for 
the smooth operations of the firm. Virtue ethics on the other polarity entails chastity, 
excellence and good character and virtue ethics is broadly divided into two 
paramount aspects and which are: affective and intellectual and as regards to 
affective: it relates to doing the right thing and being positive while intellectual 
relates doing acts that are virtuous with the right reason (Abdullah and Valentine, 
2009). 
 
2.7 Summary of Review and Identified Gap in Knowledge 
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Having critically appraised some pertinent literatures on corporate governance and 
some salient points having been buttressed above, it is imperative to state that the 
coherent gap observed by the myriads of literatures reviewed is that none of the 
authors stated how the relevant stakeholders affect or influence corporate governance 
in financial institutions like Banks.  
It is germane to mention, that most of the literatures reviewed concentrated more on 
how those managing or steering the affairs of the financial institutions can protect 
the interest of the shareholders. The literatures did not put into consideration, on how 
other stakeholders can affect or influence the corporate governance of financial 
institutions. The previous literature reviewed did not adumbrate on how other 
stakeholders role, like the services of the employee, the feedback of the customers, 
the general meetings of the shareholders and the supervision of the appropriate 
regulators, can affect corporate governance in financial institutions like Banks.  
This research intends to fill the above stated gaps observed by x-raying how the roles 
of the relevant stakeholders affect corporate governance in financial institutions. 
Furthermore, the research will also show how the roles of these stakeholders 
encourage good corporate governance in financial institutions and how it affects the 


















RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
 
3.1 Introduction  
According to Rajit (2015), methodology in any research, is the mechanism or means 
through which data are taken or collected in respect of a particular study. 
The researcher in this research adopted both doctrinal and non-doctrinal method of 
research. 
However, as regards to doctrinal method of research, adopted by the researcher, it 
entails primarily the use of secondary sources of law such as textbooks, journals, 
articles, and internet material, to ascertain the current issues as it relates to the topic 
of this work. Secondary sources were primarily used for review of previous 
literatures in this area of study and buttressing salient points in this research work. 
Also, as regards to non- doctrinal and which constitutes the major method adopted 
by the researcher, entails the researcher going to the field to acquire data for this 
research, by administering questionnaires and conducting interviews to identify 
people’s perception as regards to the gravamen of this research. It is imperative to 
mention that administering of questionnaires and conducting interviews, in order to 
get data from the field and consequent analysis of these data, constituted the bulk of 
this research work. 
3.2 Research Design  
The Research Design that is apt for this research is Survey Design. According to 
Bolton (1992), he posited that the a survey design is used to assess and predict the 
response, opinions and views of a broad number of respondents on a particular issue 
and this kind of research design entails developing number of questions and 
presenting these questions in a definitive form to each respondents, which entails 
using the interview or questionnaire format. 
It is apposite to mention, that a survey design will be appropriate in understanding 
the topic of this work which is ‘An Appraisal of the Roles of Corporate Governance 
in Financial Institutions’  
 
3.3 Area of Study  
The geographical area of study of this research is Ireland, while the financial 
institutions comprise the population are Allied Irish Bank, Ireland and Central Bank 
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of Ireland. The Allied Irish Bank was established in 1966 and it is a fusion of The 
Royal Bank of Ireland, Provincial Bank of Ireland and Cork-based Munster and 
Leinster bank Limited.  
 
3.4 Population, Sample Size and Sampling Techniques 
In order to do a robust research and get reliable and sufficient data, the researcher 
carefully selected his population to be verifiable Shareholders, the Board of 
Directors, staff and verifiable customers of Allied Irish Bank. Also, part of the 
population of this research, of which an apt interview was conducted personally by 
the researcher, are two representatives of Central Bank of Ireland, within the rank of 
a Deputy Director in Central Bank of Ireland. 
However, the verifiable shareholders of Allied Irish Bank of Ireland were estimated 
at 86 shareholders, while its board of directors is made of 28 directors, the staff are 
158 presently and the estimate of their verifiable customers is at 1.8 million. 
Progressively, the sample size of this research work was gotten through Simple 
random sampling of the respondents and Taro Yamani Method was used in the 
sampling. 
However, in order to administer the questions to the relevant stakeholders, the 
researcher based on reliable information by an employee of the bank, targeted 
stakeholders conference of the bank, where most of the stakeholders where present, 
conducted by the bank  to evaluate the progress of the bank and on customers 
satisfaction The researcher used simple random sampling in dividing the population 
into strata or group with stratified sampling methods, respondents of this research 
work were selected from each stratum and which invariably gave each respondents 
equal opportunity to answer the questions.  It is imperative to add, that the division 
of the respondents into strata is based on the population the respondents are 
representing either as Shareholder, a Director, Staff or as Customer of Allied Irish 
Bank. The staff was selected based on departments and units. 
As regards to the interview conducted by the researcher with two Deputy-Directors 
of Central Bank of Ireland, the researcher was given the opportunity and privilege, to 






3.5 Evaluation of Method of Data Collection  
The Data of this research work were collected through the use of Questionnaire 
guide and Interview. A well-crafted 19 questions were designed to identify how 
shareholders can through their efforts enthrone good corporate governance in 
financial institution and equally protect their interest and that of other shareholders. 
The questions were aptly addressed to the shareholders of Allied Irish Bank. 
Also, 29- aptly structured questions were designed to decipher how the board of 
directors on whom the whole gamut of the concept of corporate governance 
revolves, guarantee adequate corporate in financial institution. 
The third questionnaire was addressed to the staff of the bank and 15 well-structured 
question were designed to identify how the staff, through the concerted efforts of the 
management, will ensure adequate corporate governance in the financial institution.  
The last questionnaire was addressed to the verifiable customers of the above stated 
financial institutions and 9 well-crafted questions were addressed to the customers to 
deduce how their relevant feedbacks aid apt  policies to be  put in place by the board 
of directors, on whom the concept of corporate governance revolves, thereby 
allaying fears of the customers, being the vulnerable stakeholders and also 
depositors. The questions were equally structured to identify how customer 
satisfaction can be ensured by the management.   
The questionnaires used in this research were divided into sections “A” and “B”. 
Section “A” of the questionnaire was crafted in such a way as to give personal 
information of the respondents and these personal information were crafted in such a 
way the respondents identity won’t be divulged  in whatsoever form and which will 
help in getting reliable and authentic information for this research from the 
respondents. 
The Questionnaires addressed to the Staff, Customers and Board of Directors of 
Allied Irish Bank were designed in form of logical statements and questions, such as 
to respond by the respondents with the answers: Strongly disagree, Disagree, 
Strongly Agree, Agree and Undecided and also a Yes or No. However, the 
questionnaire addressed to the Shareholders or investors of the bank, where designed 
in form of logical statements only and the Shareholders or investors are to answer 
Strongly Agree, Agree, Strongly Disagree, Disagree, Undecided. 
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Finally, in order to be given the privilege of conducting an interview with two 
Deputy-Directors of Central Bank of Ireland, the researcher formally wrote to the 
institution, for a formal interview to be conducted with the aforementioned 
designated persons on the effectiveness of regulatory supervision of corporate 
governance of financial institution. The questions used for the interview were 
couched in open-ended questions for the interviewees to aptly express their opinion, 
feelings and thoughts. 
3.6 Techniques Used in Data Analysis  
The analysis of the collected data from the field is vital in any research. The analysis 
and presentations of the data shows the majority perception of the respondents over 
the topic of research. 
The analysis and presentation of data collected through the questionnaires 
administered, was done using Quantitative method and which was basically because 
of the population involved and presented in table format, using simple percentage, to 
demystify the data and descriptive statistics is also used in the data analysis. Also, 
the researcher used qualitative method of data analysis to analyse the interviews 
conducted from representatives of Central Bank of Ireland.  
 
3.7 Justification of Method Used  
The two methods applied in this research were quite quintessential in the sense that 
doctrinal method was quite apposite particularly in reviewing of related literatures 
and identifying the current issues in corporate governance while non-doctrinal which 
entails the use of questionnaire and interviews, to acquire data for the research is 
quite apt in the sense that the researcher did not only rely on the publications by 
authors, but went to the field to collect raw data in form of views and opinions of the 
major stakeholders of corporate governance of financial institution from the field and 
the use of both research method from the forgoing will enhance the reliability of  this 
research and the issue of reliability also justifies the  use of survey design. 
Also, on significance of the methods used in analyzing and presenting data, the 
quantitative method was used because of the high population of the research and the 
table used for presentation and descriptive statistics were mainly for clarity purposes. 
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Furthermore, the qualitative method of data analysis used by the researcher, in 
analyzing the interviews conducted with the representatives of AIB, is to evaluate 
the thoughts and opinions of the representative, on how apt supervision of corporate 
governance in financial will ensure adequate corporate governance. 
3.8 Conclusion  
The method adopted in this research will be of immense help to experts in financial 
institutions, Board of directors, Shareholders, Staff and Customers of Financial 
Institutions to decipher at a glance on the data presentation, how their concerted 
efforts will help in enthroning apt corporate governance in financial Institutions and 





















DATA PRESENTATION, ANALYSIS, AND FINDINGS 
4.1 Introduction 
It is apposite to posit that research is mainly meant to create data for analysis and 
these data, which are mainly taken from the field, is in substantial volume of 
statistical information, which is often in its raw form.  
However, in order to make these data collected from the field meaningful for an apt 
research, the data have to be reduced to sizeable or manageable proportion, which 
gives rise to tabulation of the data and followed by data analysis and  data 
presentation.  
Notably, this research relied on data collected from primary sources. As regards to the 
first questionnaires, which was administered to the verifiable shareholders of Allied 
Irish Bank of Ireland, a sample size of one hundred and five (105) respondents were 
taken from the shareholders of the bank and only eighty-two (82) of the questionnaires 
out of 105 were successfully completed and returned, while twenty-three (23), were 
not returned to the researcher. The aforementioned accounts for hundred percent 
(100%) of the respondents (shareholders) issued with the question. However, the 
responses from the eighty-two questionnaires were analyzed.  
The second questionnaires which were administered to the Directors of AIB, a sample 
size of 35 respondents were taken from Directors of the bank and only 30 of the 
questionnaires out of thirty- five (35), were successfully completed and returned to the 
researcher, while 5 of the questionnaires weren’t returned. The aforementioned 
accounts for the hundred percent (100%) of the respondents. The researcher analyzed 
the thirty responses. 
Nevertheless, the third questionnaire, which was administered to the staff of AIB, a 
sample size of 120 staff of the bank were taken and only 100 of the questionnaires 
were completed and returned and 20 were not returned. The aforementioned accounts 
for the hundred percent (100%) of the questionnaires issued to the respondents (staff) 
and of which 100 were systematically analyzed. 
Finally, the fourth questionnaires, which were administered to the verifiable customers 
of AIB, a sample size of 145 verifiable customers of the Bank were taken and only 90 
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of the questionnaires were completed and returned, fifty-five (55), weren’t returned to 
the researcher.     
4.2 Data Presentation and Analysis 
Data Presentation is the formal show of the edited coded and recorded data for the 
easy comprehension of the reader of this research on the breakdown of the data used 
and analysis. The researcher analyzed the data through the tabular format.  
Presentation and Analysis of Shareholders of AIB Responses. 
Table 1.1, Gender Distribution  
Sex Frequency  Percentage (%) 
Male  56 68.3 % 
Female 26 31.7 % 
Total 82 100 
Source: Field Survey, 2020. 
Table 1.1 reveals that 56 (68.3%) of the respondents are male, while 26 (31.7%) 
constitute the female gender. However, the survey shows that majority of the 
respondents are male, that are considered to be objective.  
Table 1.2, Educational Qualification   
Educational Qualification Frequency Percentage (%)  
Cambridge  10 12.2 
OND 12 14.6 
HND/ BSC 36 43.9 
Others  24 29.3  
Total  82 100 
Source Field Survey, 2020 
Table 1.2 shows that 10 (12.2%) of the respondents are Cambridge holders, 12 
(14.6%) are OND holders, 36 (43.9%) of the respondents are holders of HND/BSC 
and which constitutes the majority of the respondents, 24 (29.3%) of the respondents 
are the group that were not specified in the survey. It is pertinent to state that the 
spread of educational level is apt for the survey as it provides a variety of responses, 
which is imperative for the survey and the survey constituting HND/ BSC as the 
majority shows that the majority are those that aptly understand the nitty-gritty and 
gravamen of the research.  
Table 1.3, Age Distribution  
Age Distribution Frequency  Percentage (%) 
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21-35 12 14.6  
35- 55 60 72.2 
55-65 10 12.2 
Total 82 100 
  Source: Field Survey, 2020. 
Table 1.3 reveals that 12 (14.6 %) of the respondents are within the age range of 21-
35, 60 (72.2%) are of the age range of while 35-55 and 10 (12.2%), are within the 
age range of 55-65.  
Table 1.4, Number of Years as Investors in the Financial Institution 
Number of Years as 
Investors  
Frequency  Percentage (%) 
Below 10 Years 14 17.1 
10-20 Years  56 68.3 
Above 20 Years 12 14.6 
Total 82 100 
Source: Field Survey, 2020. 
Table 1.2 reveals coherently that 14 (17.1 %) of the respondents have been an 
investor in the financial institution below 10 years, 56 (68. 3%) of the respondents 
have been investors between the age of 10-20 and which ordinarily constitutes the 
majority, while (12),14.6% of the respondents are within the range of 20 years and 
above. It is apposite to state that the years of experience distribution is an essential 
consideration as it allows the survey capture overview opinions from individuals 
who have mostly practical knowledge of the financial institution.  
Table 1.5, Question 1: Separation of Ownership from Management of the 
Financial Institution will lead to high productivity of the organization.  
Responses  Number of Respondents  Percentage (%) 
Agree 40 48.8 
Strongly Agree 22 26.8 
Disagree 8 9.8 
Strongly Disagree 2 2.4 
Undecided  10 12.2 
Total 82 100 
Source: Field Survey, 2020. 
From table 1.5 40 (48.8%) of the respondents agree that separation of Ownership 
from management of the Financial Institution will lead to high productivity, 22 
(26.85%) of the respondents strongly agree with the aforementioned assertion, which 
lends more credence to the assertion that separation of Ownership from management 
42 
 
of the Financial Institution will lead to high productivity, which is a total majority 
affirmation. 8 (9.8%) of the respondents disagree with the majority, a minute 2 
(2.4%), strongly disagrees with the majority, while 10 (12.2%), were undecided on 
whether that separation of Ownership from management of the Financial Institution 
will lead to high productivity. The majority affirmation of the assertion lends more 
credence to Rongli, Y. (2005) opinion that that Corporate Governance relates 
division of management and ownership of a Corporation and of which such division, 
leads to principal-agent relationship, that will boost the productivity of the firm. 
 
Table 1.6, Question 2:  There is need to put stringent policies and rules that will 
guide management of financial institutions. 
Responses  Number of Respondents Percentage (%) 
Agree 22 26.8 
Strongly Agree 54 65.9 
Disagree 4 4.9 
Strongly Disagree 0 0 
Undecided  2 2.4 
Total  82 100 
Source: Field Survey, 2020.  
Table 1.6 shows that 22 (26.8%) of the respondents, agree that there is need to put 
stringent policies that will guide the management of financial institution, 54 (65.9%) 
strongly agree with the aforementioned assertion and which constitutes the majority 
of the respondents, these majority that strongly agree for a stringent policy and rule 
to be put in place to guide financial institution, affirms the averment of Guido 
(2016), that because of the volatility of financial institutions, that polices should be 
set out for the management, to enable them manage the  risk that are visible in 
financial institutions. Also, from the survey, infinitesimal 4 (4.9%), disagreed with 
the assertion, while 2 (2.4%) were undecided, none strongly disagreed.  In a nutshell, 
majority are of the opinion, of the need to put stringent policies that will guide the 
management of financial institution. 
Table 1.7, Question 3:  The Shareholders ought to put policies that will warrant 
the Management to always consult the Shareholders before taking critical 
decisions.  
Responses  Number of Respondents Percentage (%) 
Agree 38 46.3 
Strongly Agree 36 44 
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 Disagree 2 2.4 
Strongly Disagree 0 0 
Undecided 6 7.3 
Total  82 100 
Source: Field Survey, 2020.  
From Table 1.7, 38 (46.3%) respondents, agree that shareholders ought to put polices 
that will warrant the management to always consult the shareholder before taking 
critical decisions, also 36 (44%), equally strongly agree  to the aforementioned 
statement, while 2(2.4%), strongly disagree and 6 (7.3%0 were undecided on the 
issue. None of the respondents strongly disagreed. It can be deciphered that the 
majority of the respondents affirmed , shareholders ought to put polices that will 
warrant the management to always consult the shareholder before taking critical 
decisions.  
Table 1.8, Question 4: The Shareholders ought to always checkmate the actions 
and decisions of the Management. 
Response Number of Respondents Percentage (%) 
Agree 22 26.8 
Strongly Agree 46 56.1 
Disagree 2 2.4 
Strongly Disagree 4 4.9 
Undecided  8 9.8 
Total  82 100 
Source: Field Survey, 2020. 
 
Table 1.8 reveals that 22 (26.8%) of the respondents agree that shareholders ought to 
always checkmate the actions and decision of the management, 46 (56%), strongly 
agree to the assertion previously stated and that lends credence to that assertion, 
because it constitutes the majority of the respondents and  which invariably is the 
majority opinion. However, 2 (2.4%) of the respondents disagree that shareholders 
ought to always checkmate the actions and decision of the management, 4 (4.95%), 
also strongly disagreed with the aforementioned statement, while 8 (9.8%) were 
undecided on the issue. It can identified from the survey, that the majority affirms 
the fact that shareholders ought to always checkmate the actions and decision of the 
management and which further buttresses the point made by Omankhanln et al. 
(2013) that corporate governance entails how those at the helm of management of 
the organization are held accountable to the shareholders, that invested in the 




Table 1.9, Question 5: Customers Satisfaction in Financial Institution should 
always be the watchword of shareholders in putting rules and regulations that 
will guide the board of directors. 
Responses  Number of Respondents  Percentage (%) 
Agree 22 26.8 
Strongly Agree 46 56.1 
Disagree 6 7.3 
Strongly Disagree 4 4.9 
Undecided  4 4.9 
Total 82 100 
Source: Field Survey, 2020. 
 
Table 1.9 shows that 22 (26.8%) of the respondents agree that customer’s 
satisfaction in financial institution, should always be the watchword in putting rules 
and regulations that will guide the board of directors, 46 (56.1%) of respondents 
strongly agree with the aforementioned statement, and which constitutes the majority 
opinion in this survey. 6 (7.3%) of the respondents disagree with the popular opinion 
in this survey, 4 (4.9%) of the respondents also strongly disagree with the popular 
opinion in this survey, while 4 (4.9%) were undecided on the issue. The popular 
opinion in this survey further confirms the opinion of Umoh, (2002), wherein he 
stated that corporate governance provides the foundation on which the banks achieve 
its set out business objectives and also help in protecting the interest of not just the 
investors of the bank, but all the stakeholders, that have legitimate interest to protect. 
It is germane to state that one of those stakeholders is customer. 
 
Table 1.10, Question 6: Shareholders ought to put in measures to ensure that 
the activities of board of directors generates shareholders value. 
Responses Number of Responses  Percentage (100%) 
Agree 44 53.7 
Strongly Agree 18 21.9 
Disagree 0 0 
Strongly Disagree 0 0 
Undecided  20 24.4 
Total 82 100 
Source: Field Survey, 2020. 
 
From the table 1.10 44 (53%) of the respondents agree that shareholders ought to put 
in measures, to ensure that the activities of directors generates shareholders value 
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and this constitutes the popular opinion, 18 (21.9%) of the respondents strongly 
agree with the popular opinion in this survey and which further affirms the popular 
opinion in this survey. None neither agreed nor disagreed with the popular opinion, 
while 20 (24.4%) are undecided on the issue. The popular opinion affirms the 
averment of  Vintila and Gherghina (2012), that the nitty-gritty of Corporate 
Governance, according to is to limit to the barest minimum, the ineffectual posture 
of board of directors towards the activities and operations of an organization and 
principally protect the interest of shareholders in the organization. 
 
Table 1.11, Question 7: Shareholders should ensure adequate compensation of 
the board of directors to encourage them to make combined effort in increasing 
the productivity of the organization. 
Responses  Number of 
Respondents  
Frequency  
Agree 28 34.1 
Strongly Agree 44 53.7 
Disagree 6 7.3 
Strongly Disagree 0 0 
Undecided 4 4.9 
Total 82 100 
Source: Field Survey, 2020. 
Table.1.11 reveals that 28 (34.1%) of the respondents agree that shareholders should 
ensure adequate compensation of the board of directors to encourage them to make 
combined effort in increasing the productivity of the organization, 44 (53.7 %) of the 
respondents strongly agree with the aforementioned opinion and which constitutes 
the larger part of the opinion in this survey. 6 (7.3%) of the respondents disagree that 
shareholders should ensure adequate compensation of the board of directors to 
encourage them to make combined effort in increasing the productivity of the 
organization, none strongly disagree, while 4, where not undecided on the issue. In 
summary, the majority opinions agree that shareholders should ensure adequate 
compensation of the board of directors to encourage them to make combined effort 
in increasing the productivity of the organization. 
Table 1.12, Question 8:  The Management and Employees of a company should 
always be Shareholders in order to protect the investment of the shareholders 
Responses  Number of Responses  Percentage (%) 
Agree 12 14.6 
Strongly Agree 8 9.8 
Disagree 38 46.3 
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Strongly Disagree 16 19.5 
Undecided  8 9.8 
Total 82 100 
Source: Field Survey. 
From Table 1.12, it can be deciphered that 12 (14.6%) of the respondents agree that 
the Management and Employees of a company should always be Shareholders in 
order to protect the investment of the shareholders, 8 (9.8%) of the respondents 
strongly agree with the aforementioned assertion, 38 (46.3%), of the respondents 
disagree with the respondents and this constitutes the popular opinion of the survey, 
16 (19.5%) of the respondents strongly disagree and is in accordance  with the 
popular opinion in the survey and it lends credence to the survey. 8 (9.8%) of the 
respondents are undecided on the matter. The survey shows in summary that 
majority disagrees to the fact that management and employees of a company should 
always be Shareholders in order to protect the investment of the shareholders.  
Table 1.13, Question 9: Reviewing the day to day activities of the directors by 
the shareholders will make them accountable. 
Respondents  Number of Respondents  Percentage (%) 
Agree 36 43.9 
 Strongly Agree 26 31.7 
Disagree 10 12.2 
Strongly Disagree 2 2.4 
Undecided  8 9.8 
Total 82 100 
Source: Field Survey. 
Table 1.13 reveals that 36 (43.9%) of the respondents agree to the review of the day 
to day activities of directors, will make them accountable and this constitutes the 
majority opinion, 26 (31.7% strongly agree with the majority opinion, which further 
lends credence to the majority opinion. 10 (12.2%) of the respondents disagree that 
review of the day to day activities of directors will make them accountable, 2 (2.4%) 
strongly disagree with the majority opinion, while 8 (9.8%) were undecided on the 
issue. In short, majority opinion in the survey, agree that review of the day to day 
activities of directors, will make them accountable.  
Table 1.14, Question 10: Unethical practices by directors of financial 
institutions in financial reporting such as earning management is due to lack of 
incentive to the directors by the shareholders. 
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Responses  Number of Respondents  Percentage (%) 
Agree 32 39.0 
Strongly Agree 12 14.6 
Disagree 26 31.7 
Strongly Disagree 8 9.8 
Undecided  4 4.9 
Total  82 100 
Source: Field Survey, 2020. 
Table 1.14 shows that 32 (39.0) of the respondents agree that unethical practices by 
directors of financial institutions in financial reporting such as earning management 
is due to lack of incentive to the directors by the shareholders and this constitutes the 
majority opinion in this survey, 12 (14.6%) of the respondents strongly agree with 
the majority opinion, 26 (31.7), disagree that unethical practices by directors of 
financial institutions in financial reporting such as earning management is due to 
lack of incentive to the directors by the shareholders, it is apposite to point out that 
those that disagreed with the majority opinion constitute a meaningful number of 
respondents, 8 (9.l8%) of the respondents strongly disagree with the majority 
opinion, while 4 (4.9%) of the respondents are quite undecided on the issue. In 
summary, the majority agree that unethical practices by directors of financial 
institutions in financial reporting such as earning management is due to lack of 
incentive to the directors by the shareholders. 
Table 1.15, Question 11:  Signing of a Conflict Interest form should be one of 
the criteria for appointment of directors, in order to checkmate their excesses 
by shareholders. 
 
Responses  Number of Responses  Percentage (%) 
Agree 52 63.4 
Strongly Agree 22 26.8 
Disagree 0 0 
Strongly Disagree 0 0 
Undecided  8 9.8 
Total 82 100 
Source: Field Survey, 2020. 
 
From Table 1.15 shows that 52 (63.4%) of the respondents agree that Signing of a 
Conflict Interest form should be one of the criteria for appointment of directors, in 
order to checkmate the excesses of shareholders, 22 (26.8%) of the respondents 
strongly agree with the previous assertion, and this constitutes the popular opinion in 
this survey, none neither disagreed nor strongly disagreed with the popular opinion 
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in this survey while 8 (9.8%) of the respondents are undecided on the issue in 
question. It can be deduced from the survey that majority supports that signing of a 
Conflict Interest Form should be one of the criteria for appointment of directors, in 
order to checkmate their excesses by the shareholders. 
 
Table 1.16, Question 12:  Reviewing the actions and decisions of directors by the 
shareholders will not make the directors accountable. 
Respondents  Number of Respondents  Percentage (%) 
Agree 34 41.5 
Strongly Agree 12 14.6 
Disagree 34 41.5 
Strongly Disagree 2 2.4 
Undecided  0 0 
Total  82 100 
Source: Field Survey. 
 
It can be deduced from Table 1.16, that 34 (41.5%) of the respondents agree that 
reviewing the actions and decisions of directors by the shareholders won’t make the 
directors accountable, 12 (14.6%) of the respondents strongly agree with the 
aforementioned statement. However, 34 (41.4%) of the respondents disagree that 
reviewing the actions and decisions of directors by the shareholders won’t make the 
directors accountable, 2 (2.4) of the respondents strongly disagree while none was 
recorded undecided in the issue.  It can be deciphered from the survey that there is a 
tie, in the sense that same numbers of respondents both agreed and disagreed on the 
assertion. However this can be resolved in the same survey by checking the 
respondents that strongly agree and strong disagree and in which from the survey 12 
(14.6%) of the respondents strongly agree and which lends credence and an addition 
to those that agree, while just 2 (2.4%), strongly disagree. Flowing from the 
explanation, there is a positive affirmation by the majority that reviewing the actions 
and decisions of directors by the shareholders will not make the directors 
accountable. 
 
Table 1.1, Question 13:  The shareholders cannot not achieve good corporate 
governance by mere checkmating the decisions and actions of the Directors of 
the financial institution. 
Respondents  Number of Respondents  Percentage (%) 
Agree 38 46.3 
Strongly Agree 24 29.3 
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 Disagree  6 7.3 
Strongly Disagree 4 4.9 
Undecided  10 12.2 
Total 82 100 
Source: Field Survey. 
It can be deciphered that 38 (46.3%) of the respondents agree that shareholders 
cannot not achieve good corporate governance by mere checkmating the decisions 
and actions of the Directors of the financial institution and this entails the majority 
opinion in this survey, 24 (29.3) of the respondents strongly agree with the 
aforementioned assertion, which lends credence to the popular opinion in this 
survey. 6 (7.3%) of the respondents disagree with the popular opinion in this survey, 
infinitesimal 4 (4.9%) strongly disagree with the majority while 10 (12%), are 
undecided on the issue. In brief, the majority opinion is that the shareholders cannot 
not achieve good corporate governance by mere checkmating the decisions and 
actions of the Directors of the financial institution. 
 
Table 1.18 Question 14: The volatile nature of financial institutions put 
shareholders at high risk if not managed appropriately by the directors. 
Responses  Number of Respondents  Percentage (100%) 
Agree 48 58.5 
Strongly Agree 26 31.7 
Disagree 8 9.8 
Strongly Disagree 0 0 
Undecided  0 0 
Total 82 100 
Source: Field Survey. 
It can be inferred from Table 1.18, that 48(58.5%) of the respondents agree that 48 
(58.5%) of the respondents agree that the volatile nature of financial institutions put 
shareholders at high risk if not managed appropriately by the directors and this 
establishes the popular opinion in this survey, 26 (31.7%) of the respondents 
strongly supports the popular opinion. 8 (9.8%) of the respondents disagree with the 
popular opinion and none of the respondents neither disagree nor was recorded 
undecided in the survey. In summary, the popular opinion affirms that volatile nature 





Table 1.19, Question 15: A persistent and good relationship of the shareholders 
and the board of directors will lead to good corporate governance. 
Respondents  Number of Respondents  Percentage (%) 
Agree 18 22 
Strongly Agree 38 46.3 
Disagree 4 4.9 
Strongly Disagree 2 2.4  
Undecided  20 24.4 
Total 82 100 
Source: Field Survey  
 
Table 1.19 shows that 18 (22%) of the respondents agree that a persistent and good 
relationship of the shareholders and the board of directors will lead to good corporate 
governance, 38% (46.3%) of the respondents strongly agree with the aforementioned 
opinion and establish the majority opinion in this survey. Infinitesimal 4 (4.9%) and 
2 (2.4%) of the respondents, disagree and strongly disagree respectively with the 
majority opinion in this survey, while a reasonable number of 20 (24.4%) of the 
respondents were undecided on the issue. However, it can be seen from the analysis, 
that the majority opinion supports that persistent and good relationship of the 
shareholders and the board of directors will lead to good corporate governance. 
 
Table 1.20, Question 16: To avoid conflict interest in the financial institution, it 
is appropriate to create a separate role of the chairman of the board and the 
Chief Executive Officer. 
Responses  Number of Respondents  Percentage (%) 
Agree 26 31.7 
Strongly Agree 38 46.3 
Disagree 8 9.8 
Strongly Disagree 6 7.3 
Undecided  4 4.9 
Total 82 100 
Source: Field Survey, 2020.  
From Table 1.20, it can be deduced that 26 (31.7%) of the respondents agree that to 
avoid conflict interest in the financial institution, it is appropriate to create a separate 
role of the chairman of the board and the Chief Executive Officer, 38(46.3) of the 
respondents strongly agree with the aforementioned statement and this constitutes 
the majority opinion of this survey. 8 (9.8%) and 6 (7.3%) of the respondents 
disagree and strongly disagree respectively that to avoid conflict interest in the 
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financial institution, it is appropriate to create a separate role of the chairman of the 
board and the Chief Executive Officer, while 4 (4.9%) are undecided on the issue.  In 
a nutshell, the majority opinion agrees that to avoid conflict interest in the financial 
institution, it is appropriate to create a separate role of the Chairman of the Board 
and the Chief Executive Officer. 
 
Table 1.21, Question 17: Threatening directors of relieving their appointment at 
every slight mistake will enhance accountability. 
Responses  Number of Respondents  Percentage (%) 
Agree 26 31.7 
Strongly Agree 54 65.9 
Disagree 0 0 
Strongly Disagree 0 0 
Undecided  2 2.4 
Total 82 100 
Source: Field Survey, 2020.  
 
From Table 1.21, 26 (31%) of the respondents agree that threatening directors of 
relieving their appointment at every slight mistake will enhance accountability. 54 
(65.9%) of the respondents strongly agree with the aforementioned assertion and 
which establishes the majority decision in this survey. None of the respondents 
disagreed nor strongly disagreed, while 2 (2.4%) of the respondents are undecided on 
the issue.  It is germane to point out that the majority opinion affirms the fact that 
threatening directors of relieving their appointment at every slight mistake will 
enhance accountability. 
 
Table 1.22: Question18: Reviewing the managerial skills of Directors of 
Financial Institutions before appointment will curtail Financial Crisis of 
Financial Institutions 
Responses  Number of Respondents  Percentage (%) 
Agree 38 46.3 
Strongly Agree 28 34.1 
Disagree 2 2.4 
Strongly Disagree 0 0 
Undecided  14 17.1 
Total 82 100 
Source: Field Survey, 2020.  
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From Table 1.2, 38 (46.3%) of the respondents agree that reviewing the managerial 
skills of directors of Financial Institutions before appointment will curtail Financial 
Crisis of Financial Institutions and this is the majority opinion in this survey, 28 
(34.1%)strongly agrees with the majority opinion and which further affirms the 
popular opinion in this survey. 2 (2.4%) of the respondents disagreed with the 
popular opinion, none of the respondents disagree with the popular opinion while 14 
of the respondents are undecided on the issue. In brief, the popular opinion in this 
survey, is reviewing the managerial skills of directors of Financial Institutions before 
appointment will curtail Financial Crisis of Financial Institutions.  
 
Table 1.23, Question 19: Due diligence check on directors will help curtail some 
unethical practices of Directors    
Responses  Number of Respondents  Percentage (100%) 
Agree 8 9.8 
Strongly Agree 74 90.2 
Disagree 0 0 
Strongly Disagree 0 0 
Undecided  0 0 
Total 82 100 
Source: Field Survey  
From table 1.23, 8 (9.8%) of the respondents agree that due diligence will help 
curtail some unethical practices of directors, 74 (90.2%) affirms the assertion 
strongly and this is quite a mammoth affirmation and constitutes the majority 
opinion. None of the respondents disagreed, strongly disagreed nor was recorded 
undecided. The majority opinion in this survey supports the view that due diligence 
checks on directors will help curtail some unethical practices of Directors.  
 
Table 1.24 Question 20: The concerted roles of the stakeholders of corporate 
governance in financial institution that is made of the management, 
shareholders, employees, customers and regulators of a financial institution, 
will ensure good corporate governance in a financial institution.  
Responses  Number of Respondents  Percentage (%) 
Agree 36  43.9 
Strongly Agree 14 17.1 
Disagree 6 7.3 
Strongly Disagree 4 4.9 
Undecided  22 26.8 
Total 82 100 
Source:  Field Survey, 2020.  
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Table 1.24 reveals that 36 (43.9%) of the respondent agree that  the concerted roles 
of the stakeholders of corporate governance in financial institution that is made of 
the management, shareholders, employees, customers and regulators of a financial 
institution, will ensure good corporate governance in a financial institution and this 
constitutes the majority opinion, 14 (17.1%) of the respondents strongly agree with 
the aforementioned statement. 6 (7.3%) of the respondents disagree with the popular 
opinion, 4 (4.9%) of the respondents strongly disagree with the popular opinion, 
while 22 (26.8%) were undecided on the issue. In brief, the popular opinion is that 
concerted roles of the stakeholders of corporate governance in financial institution 
that is made of the management, shareholders, employees, customers and regulators 
of a financial institution, will ensure good corporate governance in a financial 
institution.   
Table 1.24, Question 21: The concerted roles of the stakeholders of corporate 
governance in financial institution that is made of the management, 
shareholders, employees, customers and regulators of a financial institution, 
will not ensure good corporate governance in a financial institution. 
Responses Number of Responses  Percentage (%) 
Agree 10 12.2 
Strongly Agree 8 9.8 
Disagree 2 2.4 
Strongly Disagree 12 14.6 
Undecided  50 61 
Total 82 100 
Source: Field Survey, 2020.   
Table 1.24 shows that 10 (12.2%) of the respondents agree that the concerted roles of 
the stakeholders of corporate governance in financial institution that is made of the 
management, shareholders, employees, customers and regulators of a financial 
institution, will not ensure good corporate governance in a financial institution, 
minute 8 (9.8%) of the respondents strongly agree to the aforementioned statement. 
2(2.4%) of the respondents disagree that the concerted roles of the stakeholders of 
corporate governance in financial institution that is made of the management, 
shareholders, employees, customers and regulators of a financial institution, will not 
ensure good corporate governance in a financial institution,  12 (14.6%) of the 
respondents strongly disagree with aforementioned assertion while a mammoth 50 
(61%) of the respondents were undecided.   
 
Respondents: Directors of Allied Irish bank.  
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Table 2.1, Gender Distribution 
Gender Distribution  Frequency  Percentage (%) 
Male 15 50 
Female 15 50 
Total 30 100 
Source: Field Survey, 2020  
From table 2.1, 15 (50%) of the respondents are male, while 15 (50%) of the 
respondents are women. The gender distribution is pertinent because it gives the two 
opposite genders equal chance to express their opinion.  
Table 2.2,   Educational Qualification 
Educational 
Qualification 
Frequency  Percentage (%) 
HND 5 16.7 
BSC/LLB 9 30 
MSC 6 20 
PHD 5 16.7 
Other 5 16.7 
Total 30 100 
Source: Field Survey, 2020 
Table 2.2 reveals 5 (16.7%) of the respondents are HND holders, 9 (30%) of the 
respondents are the holders of BSC/LLB, MSC holders constitute 6 (20%) of the 
shareholders, 5 (16.7%) of the shareholders are PHD holders, while 5 (16.7%) are 
the respondents that their certificates weren’t specified. It is apposite to state that the 
purpose of putting the educational qualification is to show that those that were 
administered the question were those that do appreciate the purpose and the rationale 
behind the questionnaire.  
Table 2.3, Age Distribution  
Age Distribution Frequency  Percentage (%) 
21-35 20 66.7 
35-55 8 26.7 
55-60 2 6.7 
60 and Above 0 0 
Total 30 100 
Source: Field Survey, 2020  
Table 2.3 reveals that 20 (66.7%) of the respondents are within the age range of 21-
35, which constitutes the majority of the respondents, 8 (26.7%) of the respondents 
are of the range of 35-55, 2 (6.7%) constitutes respondents that within the range of 
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54-60 while none of the respondents indicated to be within the range of 60 and 
above. Nevertheless, it is imperative to add that the age range that constitutes the 
majority, are those that do understand the basis of the research and the need to give 
objective answers.  
Table 2.4, Number of Years as a Director  
Number of Years as a 
Director  
Frequency Percentage (%) 
Below 10 Years  16 53.3  
10-20 Years  8 26.7 
Above 20 Years  6 20 
Total 30 100 
Source: Field Survey, 2020.  
Table 2.4 shows that 16 (53.3%) of the respondents are below 10 years as director of 
the Bank and this constitutes the majority of the respondents in this survey, 8 
(26.7%) of the respondents are within the age of 10-20 years, while a minute 6 
(20%), of the respondents are above 20 years as directors. Notably, the majority 
constituting of those below 10 years is not awesome for the research, because it will 
limit the researcher gathering versed data.    
Table 2.5, Question 1: The Management of a financial institution requires 
finesse and is quite different from other organization because of the volatility of 
financial institution and the vulnerability of the customers.  
Responses  Number of Responses  Percentage (%) 
Agree 18 60 
Strongly Agree 10 33.3  
Disagree 2 6.7 
Strongly Disagree 0 0 
Undecided  0 0 
Total 30 100 
Source: Field Survey, 2020. 
From the Table 2.5, 18 (60%) of the respondents agree that the Management of a 
financial institution requires finesse and is quite different from other organization 
because of the volatility of financial institution and the vulnerability of the customers 
and this constitutes the majority opinion, 10 (33.3%) of the respondents strongly 
agree with the popular opinion and which lends credence to the majority opinion. 2 
(6.7%) of the respondents disagree with the popular opinion, while none strongly 




Table 2.6, Question 2: As a Director, did you undergo any Managerial and 
Leadership training before appointment? 
Responses  Number of Responses  Percentage (%) 
Yes 27 90 
No 3 10 
Total 30 100 
Source: Field Survey, 2020.  
Table 2.6 of reveals that 27 (90%) of the respondents had Managerial and Leadership 
training before their appointment as directors, while 3 (10%) of the respondents did 
not undergo any management and leadership training. In brief, majority of the 
directors had managerial and leadership training before their appointment.  
Table 2.7, Question 3: As a Director do you know the basis of Corporate 
Governance?  
Responses  Number of Responses  Percentage (%) 
Yes 30 100 
No 0 0 
Total 30 100 
Source: Field Survey, 2020.  
From Table 2.7, it can be deduced that 30(100%)  of the respondents understands the 
basis of corporate governance and none is oblivious of the concept, which means that 
the respondents are aware of the concept and appreciates the need of the survey, 
because according to Jensen corporate governance revolves around directors of a 
corporate entity.  
Table 2.8, Question: Directors are the centre of management in an organization  
Responses  Number of Respondents Percentage (%) 
Agree 20 66.7 
Strongly Disagree 8 26.7 
Disagree 2 6.7 
Strongly Disagree 0 0 
Undecided  0 0 
Total 30 100 
Source: Field Survey, 2020.  
Table 2.8 reveals that 20 (66.7%) of the respondents agree that Directors are the 
center of management in an organization and this constitutes the majority view, 8 
(26.7%) of the respondents affirms the popular majority, 2 (6.7%) of the respondents 
disagree with the majority opinion. None of the respondents either strongly disagreed 
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or was recorded undecided. In a nutshell the majority agrees that directors are the 
center of management in an organization.  
Table 2.9 Question 5: The Sole decisions and actions of directors in a Financial 
Institution either make or mar the financial institution   
Responses  Number of Respondents  Percentage (%) 
Agree 18 60 
Strongly Agree 10 33.3 
Disagree 2 6.7 
Strongly Disagree 0 0 
Undecided  0 0 
Total 30 100 
Source: Field Survey, 2020 
From Table 2.9, 18 (60%) of the respondents agree that the sole decisions and 
actions of directors in a financial institution either make or mar the financial 
institution and this establishes the majority opinion in this survey, 10 (33.3%) of the 
respondents strongly agree with the majority opinion in this survey, minute 2 
(33.3%) of the respondents disagree with the popular opinion, while none of the 
respondents neither strongly decided nor was recorded undecided. However, the 
popular opinion in this survey supports the view that the sole decisions and actions 
of directors in a Financial Institution either make or mar the financial institution.   
 
Table 2.10, Question 6: As a Director do you think you need to consult the 
stakeholders before taking any critical decision?  
Responses  Number of Respondents  Percentage (%) 
Yes 25 83.3  
No 5 16.7 
Total 30 100 
 Source: Field Survey  
Table 2.10 reveals that 25% (83, 3%) of the respondents affirms the fact that 
directors need to consult the stakeholders before taking critical decisions and which 
constitutes the majority opinion, while 5(16.7%) answered in negative.  
Table 2.11 Question 7:  Do you think Shareholders interest is the ultimate in 
this Financial Institution? 
Responses  Number of Responses  Percentage (%) 
Yes 15 50 
No 15 50 
Total 30 100 
Source: Field Survey, 2020  
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Table 2.11 reveals that 15% (50) of the respondents affirms the fact that 
Shareholders interest is the ultimate in the financial institution, while 15 (50%) of 
the respondents answered in the negative. However, there is a tie, in the sense there 
is no majority opinion in this survey.  
Table 2.12 Question 8: Earning Management in Financial Reporting by Board 
of Directors of Financial Institution is unethical 
Responses  Number of Responses  Percentage (%) 
Agree 15 50 
Strongly Agree 3 10 
Disagree 8 27 
Strongly Disagree 0 0 
Undecided  4 13 
Total 30 100 
Source: Field Survey, 2020.  
From Table 2.12, 15 (50%) of the respondents agree that earning Management in 
Financial Reporting by Board of Directors of Financial Institution is unethical and 
this constitutes the majority opinion, 3 (10%) of the respondents strongly agree with 
the popular opinion, 8 (27%) disagree with the popular opinion in this survey, none 
of the respondents strongly disagreed in the survey, while 4 (13%) of the 
respondents were undecided on the issue. 
Table 2.13: Question: 9 As a Director I am not under any obligation to disclose 
any profit made in the course of handling the Company’s Business 
Responses  Number of Respondents  Percentage (%) 
Agree 6 20 
Strongly Agree 0 0 
Disagree 3 10 
Strongly Disagree 20 67 
Undecided  1 3 
Total 30 100 
Source: Field Survey, 2020.  
Table 2.13, reveals that 6 (20%) of the respondents agree that directors are not under 
any obligation to disclose any profit made in the course of handling the company’s 
business, none of the respondents strongly agree with the aforementioned assertion. 
3 of the respondents disagree that that directors are not under any obligation to 
disclose any profit made in the course of handling the company’s business, 
mammoth 20 (3) of the respondents strongly disagree with the aforementioned 
assertion and this constitutes the majority opinion in this survey while 1 (30%) of the 
respondents were undecided on the issue. In summary, the majority opinion strongly 
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disagrees the assertion that that directors are not under any obligation to disclose any 
profit made while handling the company’s business.  
Table 2.14, Question 10: Do you think the customers of this Financial 
Institution are vulnerable and needs to be protected by the management? 
Responses  Number of Respondents  Percentage (%) 
Yes 28 93.3 
No 2 6.7 
Total 30 100 
Source: Field Survey, 2020.  
Table 2.14 reveals that 28 (93.3%) of the respondents answered in the affirmative 
that customers of financial institution are vulnerable and needs to be protected and 
which forms the majority opinion, while 30% (100) of the respondents answered in 
the negative.  
Table 2.15, Question 11: As a Director do you review the activities and 
productivity of your staff 
Responses  Number of Respondents  Percentage (%) 
Yes 30 100 
No 0 0 
Total 30 100 
Source: Field Survey, 2020 
From Table2.15, it can that 30 (100%) of the respondents answered in the 
affirmative, that directors do review the activity and productivity of staff and this 
constitutes the entirety of the respondent and a popular opinion. None answered in 
the negative.  
Table 2.16 Question 12: Is there any incentive put in place to encourage staff 
productivity in this financial institution?  
Responses  Number of Respondents  Percentage  
Yes  30 100 
No 0 0 
Total 30 100 
Source: Field Survey, 2020.  
Table 2.16 reveals that 30 (100%) of the respondents affirmed that there is incentive 
put in place to encourage the productivity in this financial institution, which 
constitutes the majority opinion. None answered in the negative.  
Table 2. 17 Question 13: As a Director of this Financial Institution I do not see 
anything wrong giving Loans to my cronies without Collateral. 
Responses  Number of Respondents  Percentage (%) 
Yes 5 16.7 
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No 25 83.3 
Total 30 100 
Source: Field Survey, 2020. 
Table 2.17, reveals that 5 (16.7%) of the respondents affirm that there is nothing 
wrong giving loans to their cronies without collateral, while 25 (83.3%) answered in 
the negative, meaning that they strongly oppose to giving loans to cronies without 
collateral, which is the majority opinion in this survey.  
Table 2. 18: Question 14:  Do you think it is appropriate that where Board 
decisions may affect different shareholders differently, that all shareholders 
should be treated equally?  
Responses  Number of Respondents  Percentage (%) 
Yes  24 80 
No 6 20 
Total 30 100 
Source: Field Survey, 2020.  
Table 2.18 reveals that 24 (80%) of the respondents affirmed that where board 
decisions may affect different shareholders differently, that all shareholders should 
be treated equally and which constitutes the majority of the opinion in this survey. 
While 6 (20%) of the respondents answered in the negative.  
Table 2.19: Question 15: Do you think compensating any of your staff that is 
outstanding is appropriate?  
Responses  Number of Respondents  Percentage  
Yes  28 93.3 
No 2 6.7 
Total 30 100 
Source: Field Survey, 2020.  
Table 2.19 shows that 28 (93.3%) of the respondents answered in the affirmative that 
compensation of any outstanding staff, is appropriate and which constitutes the 
majority opinion in this survey, while 2 (6.7%) of the respondents answered in the 
negative.  
Table 2.20; Question 16: There is no need for checking insider abuse in this 
Financial Institution if the directors are cooperating. 
Responses Number of Respondents  Percentage (%) 
Agree 4 13.3 
Strongly Agree 0 0 
Disagree 18 60 
Strongly Disagree 6 20 
Undecided  2 6.7 
Total  30 100 
Source: Field Survey, 2020 
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From table 2.20, 4 913.3%) agree that there is no need checking insider abuse in this 
financial institution if the directors are cooperating and which is quite unethical, 
none strongly agree with the aforementioned assertion, 18 (60 %) disagree that no 
need checking insider abuse in this financial institution if the directors are 
cooperating, which constitutes the majority and 6 (20%) of the respondents strongly 
disagree and which lends credence to the popular opinion. Minute 2 (6.7%) are 
undecided on the issue.  
Table 2.21: Question 17: There is no need for requiring collateral from big 
shareholders of this financial institution on their request for loan  
Responses  Number of Respondents Percentage (%) 
Agree 2 6.7 
Strongly agree 0 0 
Disagree 18 60 
Strongly Disagree 8 26.7 
Undecided  2 6.7 
Total  30 100 
Source: Field Survey, 2020.  
 
From Table 2.21: 2 (6.7%) of the respondents agree that there is no need for 
requiring collateral from big shareholders of this financial institution on their request 
for loan, none of the respondents strongly agree with the aforementioned assertion, 
18 (60%) of the respondents disagree that there is no need for requiring collateral 
from big shareholders of this financial institution on their request for loan and which 
constitutes the majority opinion, 8(26.7%) of the respondents strongly disagree with 
the aforementioned assertion, which lends credence to the majority opinion, while 2 
(6.7) of the respondents were undecided on the issue. 
 
Table 2.22, Question 18: Any of the Biggest Shareholders of this Financial 
Institutions can request or recommend his cronies for Loan beyond the legal 
limit and it will be approved by the directors.   
Responses Number of Respondents  Percentage (%) 
Agree 12 40 
Strongly Agree 0 0 
Disagree 10 33.3 
Strongly Disagree 8 26.7 
Undecided  0 0 
Total 30 100 
Source: Field Survey, 2020.  
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From table 2.22, it can be deduced that 12 (40%) of the respondents agree that the 
biggest shareholders of financial institutions can request and recommend his cronies 
for loans and it will be granted beyond the legal limit and this constitutes the 
majority opinion, while none of the respondents strongly agree with the 
aforementioned assertion, a mammoth 10 (33.3%) disagree with the majority 
opinion, 8(26.7%) strongly disagree with the majority opinion., while none was 
undecided on the issue.  
Tables 2.23, Question 19, As a Director are you also a Shareholder in this 
Financial Institution? 
Responses Number of Respondents   Percentage (%) 
Yes 25 83.3 
No 5 16.7 
Total  30 100 
Source: Field Survey, 2020.  
From Table 2.23, it can be shown that 25 (83,3%) of the respondents affirm that they 
are directors in the financial institution, and it constitutes the majority, while 5 
(16.7%) answered in the negative. \ 
Table 2.24 Question 20: Does this Financial Institution do in-service training for 
Staff? 
Responses  Number of Respondents  Percentage (%) 
Yes 28 93.3 
No 2 6.7 
Total 30 100 
Source: Field Survey, 2020.  
Table 2.24 reveals that 28 (93.3%) of the respondents affirm that the financial 
institution does in-service training of staff and which constitutes the majority, while 
2 (6.7%) answered in the negative.  
Table 2.25 Question 21: As a Director are you aware of any measure put in 
place for further training of staff to expose them to recent innovations in 
Financial Sector? 
 Responses  Number of Respondents   Percentage (%) 
Yes 29 96.7 
No 1 3.3 
Total 30 100 
Source: Field Survey, 2020. 
Table 2.25 shows that 29 (96.7%) of the respondents affirmed the fact that they are 
aware measure put in place for further training of staff to expose them to recent 
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innovations in Financial Sector and which constitutes the majority, while 1 (3.3%) 
answered in the negative.  
Table 2.26 Question 22:  As a Director, is there any mechanism put in place for 
assessment of the staff productivity? 
Responses  Number of Respondents  Percentage (%) 
Yes 27 90 
No 3 10 
Total 100 100 
Source: Field Survey, 2020.  
Table 2.26 reveals that 27 (90%) of the respondents answered in the affirmative, that 
there mechanism put in place to increase staff productivity and which established the 
majority, while 3 (10%) answered in the negative.  
 Table 2.27:  Question 23 Putting Mechanism for Customers Feedback in 
Financial Institution is not part of the Roles of the Directors 
 
Responses  Number of Respondents  Percentage (%) 
Agree 10 33.3 
Strongly Agree 6 20 
Disagree 10 33.3 
Strongly Disagree 2 6.7 
Undecided  2 6.7 
Total 30 100 
Source: Field Survey, 2020. 
 
Table 2.27 reveals that 10 (33,3) of the respondents agree that putting Mechanism 
for Customers Feedback in Financial Institution is not part of the Roles of the 
Directors, 6 (20%) of the respondents strongly agree with the aforementioned 
assertion and which lends credence to the assertion, while 10 (33.3 %) of the 
respondents disagree that putting Mechanism for Customers Feedback in Financial 
Institution is not part of the Roles of the Directors, 2 (6.7%) of the respondents 
strongly disagree the aforementioned assertion, while 2 (6.7%0 where undecided on 
the issue. A clear perusal of the table will show that there is a tie between the 
respondents that agree and disagree and to resolve the tie, the researcher evaluated 
the number of those that strongly agree and those that strongly disagree and came up 
with the result that those that strongly agree being higher than those that strongly 
disagree, that that strongly agree lends credence to those that agree and it constitutes 
the popular opinion.    
Table 2.28: Question 24: As a director there are compelling situations i have to 
put my interest over that of the Shareholders 
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Responses  Number of Respondents  Percentage (%) 
Agree 15 50 
Strongly Agree 2 6.7 
Disagree 3 10 
Strongly Disagree 10 33.3 
Undecided  0 0 
Total 30 100 
Source: Field Survey, 2020. 
 
Table 2.28 reveals that 15 (50%) of the respondents agree that there are compelling 
situations they have to put their interest over that of the shareholders and this 
constitutes the majority opinion and which is unethical and does not show good 
corporate governance practices, 2 (6.7%) of the respondents strongly agree with the 
aforementioned assertion. 3 (10%) of the respondents disagree that there are 
compelling situations they have to put their interest over that of the shareholders, 
mammoth 10 (33.3%) of the respondents strongly disagree with majority opinion 
while none was recorded undecided. 
 
Table 2.29, Question 25: As a Director there are situation that may warrant 
taking decisions and actions for my sole benefit because we are the mind and 
will of the company. 
 
Responses  Number of Respondents  Percentage (%) 
Agree 14 47 
Strongly Agree 2 6.7 
Disagree 4 13.3 
Strongly Disagree 8 26.7 
Undecided  2 6.7 
Total 30 100 
Source: Field Survey, 2020.  
Table 2.29 shows that  14 (47%) of the respondents agree that as a Director there are 
situation that may warrant taking decisions and actions for my sole benefit because 
we are the mind and will of the company and this constitutes the majority opinion, 
which is unethical, 2 (6.7%) of the respondents strongly agree with the majority 
opinion, 4 (13.3%) of the respondents disagree with the popular opinion in this 
survey, 8 (26.7%) of the respondents strongly disagree the popular opinion, which is 
quite apt, while minute 2 (6.7%) are undecided on the issue.  
 
Table 2.30 Question 26: As a director under performance of managerial duties 
is a stain on reputation 
Responses  Number of Respondents Percentage (%) 
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Agree 15 50 
Strongly Agree 9 30 
Disagree 4 13.3 
Strongly Disagree 0 0 
Undecided  2 6.7 
Total  30 100 
Source: Field Survey, 2020.  
 
Table 2.30 shows that 15 (50%) of the respondents agree that as a director under 
performance of managerial duties is a stain on reputation and this creates the popular 
opinion in this survey, 9 (30%) of the respondents strongly agree with the popular 
opinion. 4 (13.3%) of the respondents strongly disagree with the popular opinion in 
this survey, none strongly disagreed with the popular opinion, while 2 (6.7%) were 
undecided on the issue. 
 
Table 2.31 Question 27: The provision for concrete mechanism to prevent 
uncertainties in this Financial Institution such as hacking and robbery is the 
sole duty of the staff 
  
Responses  Number of Respondents  Percentage (%) 
Agree 12 40 
 Strongly Agree 6 20 
Disagree 10 33.3 
Strongly Disagree 0 0 
Undecided  2 6.7 
Total 30 100 
Source: Field Survey, 2020.  
 
Table 2.31 reveals that 12 (40%) of the respondents agree that the provision for 
concrete mechanism to prevent uncertainties in this Financial Institution such as 
hacking and robbery is the sole duty of the staff and this constitutes the majority 
view, which is not quite apt and does not show good corporate governance, 6 (20%) 
of the respondents strongly agree with the popular opinion in this survey. 10 (33.3%) 
of the respondents disagree with the popular opinion, none of the respondents 
strongly disagree and just 2 (6.7%) of the respondents were undecided on the issue.  
 
Table 2.32, Question 28, As a Director have you ever involved yourself in any 
unethical practice by error or omission?    
Responses  Number of Respondents  Percentage (%) 
Yes 5 16.7 
No 25 83.3 
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Total 30 100 
Source: Field Survey, 2020.  
Table 2.32, shows that 5 (16.7%) of the respondents affirm that they have informed 
themselves in unethical practices, while 25(83.3%) of the respondents answered in 
the negative and which constitutes the majority opinion.   
Table 2.33, Question 29: There has always been a presumption that Directors of 
Financial Institution always do things for their own interest. 
 
Responses  Number of Respondents  Percentage (%) 
Agree 17 56.7 
Strongly Agree 7 23.3 
Disagree 3 10 
Strongly Disagree 0 0 
Undecided  3 10 
Total 30 100 
Source: Field Survey, Field Survey, 2020 
Table 2.33 provides that 17 (56.7%) of the respondents agree that there has always 
been a presumption that Directors of Financial Institution always do things for their 
own interest and this constitutes the popular opinion, 7(23.3%), strongly agree with 
the popular opinion and which lends credence to same, 3 (10%) of the respondents 
disagree with the popular opinion in this survey, none of the respondents strongly 
disagree with the popular opinion, while 3 (10%) are undecided on the issue.  
Table 2.34 Question 30: The concerted roles of the stakeholders of corporate 
governance in financial institution that is made of the management, 
shareholders, employees, customers and regulators of a financial institution, 
will ensure good corporate governance in a financial.  
Responses Number of Respondents Percentage (%) 
Agree 20 66.7 
Strongly Agree 8 26.7 
Disagree 2 6.7 
Strongly Disagree 0 0 
Undecided  0 0 
Total 30 100 
Source: Field Survey, 2020.  
 
Table 2.34 shows that 20 (66,7%) of the respondents agree that the concerted roles of 
the stakeholders of corporate governance in financial institution that is made of the 
management, shareholders, employees, customers and regulators of a financial 
institution, will ensure good corporate governance in a financial and this constitutes 
the majority opinion in this survey, 8 (26.7%) of the respondents strongly agree with 
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the popular opinion. 2 (6.7%) of the respondents disagree with the majority opinion. 
None neither strongly agreed nor disagreed with the popular opinion. 
 
Table 2.35, Question 31: The concerted roles of the stakeholders of corporate 
governance in financial institution that is made of the management, 
shareholders, employees, customers and regulators of a financial institution, 
will not ensure good corporate governance in a financial institution. 
Responses  Number of Respondents  Percentage (%) 
Agree 12 40 
Strongly Agree 0 0 
Disagree 14 46.7 
Strongly Disagree 2 6.7 
Undecided  2 6.7 
Total 30 100 
Source: Field Survey. 2020.  
 
Table 2.35 reveals that 12 (40%) of the respondents agree that the concerted roles of 
the stakeholders of corporate governance in financial institution that is made of the 
management, shareholders, employees, customers and regulators of a financial 
institution, will not ensure good corporate governance in a financial institution, none 
of the respondents strongly agree with the aforementioned assertion, 14 (46.7%) of 
the respondents disagree that the concerted roles of the stakeholders of corporate 
governance in financial institution that is made of the management, shareholders, 
employees, customers and regulators of a financial institution, will not ensure good 
corporate governance in a financial institution and which constitutes the majority 
opinion, while 2 (6.7%) of the respondents strongly disagree with the 
aforementioned assertion and 2 (6,7%) were undecided on the issue. 
 
Respondents Staff of the Specified Financial Institution  
Table 3.1: Gender Distribution  
Gender Distribution  Frequency  Percentage (%) 
Male 64 64 
Female  36 36 
Total 100 100 
Source: field Survey.  
Table 3.1 reveals that the Male is 64 (64%) and constitutes most of the respondents, 
while 36 (36%) of the respondents are female. 
 
Table 3.2 Education Qualification 
Education Qualification Frequency  Percentage (%) 
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Cambridge  18 18 
HND 6 6 
BSC/LLB 54 54 
MSC 18 18 
PHD 4 4 
Total 100 100 
Source Field Survey, 2020.   
 
Table 3.2 shows that 18 (18%) of the respondents are Cambridge certificate holders, 
6 (6%) are HND holders, 54 (54%) are BSC/LLB holders and they constitute the 
majority in this survey and which is quite because it is within the range of persons 
that appreciates the basis of the research. 18 (18%) constitutes MSC holders, while 4 
(4%) of the respondents constitute the PHD holders. 
 
Table 3.3 Age Distribution  
Age Distribution  Frequency  Percentage (%) 
21-35 64 64 
35-55 26 26 
55-60 10 10 
65-70 0 0 
Total  100 100 
Source: Field Survey, 2020.  
Table 3.3 shows that64 (64%) of the respondents are within the age of 21-35 and this 
constitute the majority in this survey and which is quite apt, because it embodies 
those that are presumed to understand the research, 26 (26%) constitute those that are 
within the age range of 55-60 while none is within the age bracket of 65-70.  
 
Table 3.4 Years of Experience  
Years of Experience  Frequency  Percentage (%) 
Below 10 Years 80 80 
10 -20 Years  20 20 
Above 20 Years 0 0 
Total 100 100 
Source: Field Survey, 2020.  
Table 3.4 shows that 80 (80%) of the respondents are below 10 years of experience 
and which constitutes the majority, in all honesty is not too awesome for the 
research, 20 (20%) constitute those that within 10- 20 years of experience and none 
is within 20 years and above.  
Table 3.5 Question 1: Do you enjoy working in this Financial Institution? 
Responses  Number of Respondents  Percentage (%) 
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Yes 92 92 
No 8 8 
Total 100 100 
Source: Field Survey, 2020.  
Form Table 3.5, it can be deduced that 92 (92%) of the respondents answered in the 
affirmative that they enjoy working in the financial institution, which is the case 
study and constitutes the majority, while (8.985%) answered negative.  
Table 3.6 Question 2: Do you think the directors have put in pertinent measures 
to ensure high productivity of the employees?  
Responses  Number of Respondents  Percentage (%)  
Yes 85 85 
No 15 15 
Total  100 100 
Source: Field Survey, 2020.  
Table 3.6 reveals that 85 (85%) of the respondents answered in the affirmative that 
directors have put in pertinent measures to ensure high productivity of the employees 
and which constitutes a mammoth majority, while 15 (15%) of the respondents 
answered in the negative.  
Table 3.7 Question 3: Do you think that there is an obligation on your part as 
employee to ensure the smooth operations of this firm?  
Responses  Number of Respondents  Percentage (%) 
Yes  96 96 
No 4 4 
Total 100 100 
Source: Field Survey, 2020.  
 
Table 3.7 shows 96 (96 %) of the respondents affirm that there is an obligation of the 
part of the employee to ensure smooth operations of the firm, while 4 (4%) of the 
respondents answered in the negative.  
 
Table 3.8 Question 4: As an employee of this organization, the success and 
failure of this organization depends majorly on the inter-personal relationship 
between the management of this organization and the staff. 
Responses  Number of Respondents  Percentage (%) 
Agree 67 67 
Strongly Agree 23 23 
Disagree 0 0 
Strongly Disagree 3 3 
Undecided  7 7 
Total 100 100 
Source: Field Survey, 2020.  
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Table 3.8 reveals that 67 (67%) agree that as an employee of this organization, the 
success and failure of this organization depends majorly on the inter-personal 
relationship between the management of this organization and the staff and which 
creates the popular opinion in this survey, 23 (23%) of the respondents strongly 
agree with the popular opinion aand which lends credence to the popular opinion. 
None disagreed with the popular opinion, 3 (3%) of the respondents strongly 
disagree with the popular opinion in this survey, while 2 (2%) where undecided on 
the issue.    
Table 3.9 Question 5: Are the employees of this bank sent for professional 
courses to upgrade themselves with the new innovations in banking sector by 
the management 
Responses  Number of Respondents  Percentage (%) 
Yes 100 100 
No 0 0 
Total 0 100 
Source: Field Survey, 2020.  
Table 3.9 reveal that 100 (100%) of the respondents answered in the affirmative, that 
employees of this bank sent for professional courses to upgrade themselves with the 
new innovations in banking sector by the management  and which constitutes a 
complete and total majority in this survey. None answered in the negative.  
 
Table 3.10: Question 6: An incentive made available by the management to the 
employees of this financial Institution will boost the performance of the 
employees, which will invariably increase the efficiency of the firm? 
Responses Number of Respondents  Percentage (%) 
Agree 76 76 
Strongly Agree 12 12 
Disagree 0 0 
Strongly Disagree 12 12 
Undecided  0 0 
Total 100 100 
Source: Field Survey, 2020.  
Table 3.10 reveals that 76 (76%) of the respondents agree that an incentive made 
available by the management to the employees of this financial Institution will boost 
the performance of the employees, which will invariably increase the efficiency of 
the firm and this constitutes the total majority opinion in this survey, 12 (12 %) of 
the respondents strongly agree with the aforementioned assertion. None disagree 
71 
 
with the popular opinion in this survey, 12 (12%) of the respondents strongly 
disagree with the popular opinion and now was recorded undecided.    
Table 3.11, Question 7: Do you think any provision by the management for 
monetary appreciation or otherwise of outstanding employee of this financial 
Institution will boost the staff morale? 
Response  Number of Respondents  Percentage (%) 
Agree 65 65 
Strongly Agree 23 23 
Disagree 0 0 
Strongly Disagree 0 0 
Undecided  12 12 
Total 100 100 
Source: Field Survey, 2020 
Table 3.11 shows that 65 (65%) of the respondents agree that any provision by the 
management for monetary appreciation or otherwise of outstanding employee of this 
financial Institution will boost the staff morale and which is the popular opinion in 
this survey, 23% (23) of the respondents strongly agree with the aforementioned 
assertion and which lends credence to the popular opinion. None Disagreed nor 
Strongly Disagreed in this survey, while 12 (12%) were undecided on the issue.  
 
Table 3.12 Question 8: As an employee of this Financial Institution my 
allegiance is to the directors and no one else  
Response  Number of Respondents  Percentage (%) 
Agree 35 35 
Strongly Agree 13 13 
Disagree 35 35 
Strongly Disagree 15 15 
Undecided  2 2 
Total 100 100 
Source: Field Survey, 2020.  
Table 3.12 reveals that 35 (35%) of the respondents agree that as employees of the 
Financial Institution their allegiance is to the directors and no one else, 13 (13%) of 
the respondents strongly agree with the assertion. 35 (35%) of the respondents 
disagree that as employees of the Financial Institution their allegiance is to the 
directors and no one else, 15 (15%) of the respondents strongly disagree with the 
aforementioned assertion, while 2 (2%) of the respondents are undecided on the 
issue. From the survey, it can be deciphered that there is a tie between those that 
agree and disagree, in order to resolve the tie, there is need to evaluate those that 
strongly agree and those that strongly disagree and since those that strongly disagree 
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are more than those that strongly agree, it logically holds that those that disagree in 
this survey constitute the majority opinion. 
 
Table 3.13, Question 9:  The employee of this organization are meant to engage 
themselves in in- service training, organized by the management, to keep 
themselves in tune with recent innovations in banking sector in order to serve 
the customers better .  
Response  Number of Respondents  Percentage (%) 
Agree 84 84 
Strongly Agree 12 12 
Disagree 0 0 
Strongly Disagree 0 0 
Undecided  2 2 
Total 100 100 
Source: Field Survey, 2020.  
Table 3.13 shows that 84 (84) of the respondents agree that the employee of this 
organization are meant to engage themselves in in- service training, organized by the 
management, to keep themselves in tune with recent innovations in banking sector in 
order to serve the customers better and this constitutes the majority opinion in this 
survey, 12 (12%) strongly agree with the aforementioned assertion. None of the 
respondents disagreed nor strongly disagreed in this survey, while 2 (2%) where 
undecided on the issue.  
 
Table 3.14: Question 10:  There is need for assessment of individual 
performance of staff, which will boost the performance and operations of the 
firm. 
 
Responses Number of Respondents  Percentage (%) 
Agree 6 6 
Strongly Agree 88 88 
Disagree 0 0 
Strongly Disagree 0 0 
Undecided  6 6 
Total 100 100 
Source: Field Survey, 2020.  
Table 3.14  reveals that 6 (6%) of the respondents agree that there is need for 
assessment of individual performance of staff, which will boost the performance and 
operations of the firm, a mammoth 88(88%) of the respondents strongly agree with 
the aforementioned assertion and which constitutes the majority opinion, while 6 
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were recorded undecided. None of the respondents disagreed nor strongly disagreed 
in this survey.  
Table 3.15: Question 11:  As a Staff of this bank I will rate the performance of 
the Directors as excellent. 
Responses  Number of Respondents  Percentage  
Agree 78 78 
Strongly Agree 18 18 
Disagree 0 0 
Strongly Disagree 4 4 
Undecided  0 0 
Total 100 100 
Source: Field Survey, 2020.  
Table 3.15 shows that 78 (78%) of the respondents agree that staff of the bank will 
rate the performance of directors as excellent and which constitutes the majority 
opinion, 18 (18%) of the respondents strongly agree with the aforementioned 
assertion, none of the respondents disagreed in this survey, 4 (4%) of the respondents 
disagree with the popular opinion and none was recorded undecided.  
Table 3.16, Question 12: As a Staff of this bank, I can authoritatively say that 
there are rare unethical conducts of Directors observed since my employment.   
Responses  Number of Respondents  Percentage  
Agree 66 66 
Strongly Agree 22 22 
Disagree 6 6 
Strongly Disagree 3 3 
Undecided 3 3 
Total 100 100 
Source: Field Survey, 2020. 
Table 3.16 shows that 66% of the respondents strongly agree that as a Staff of the 
bank, they can authoritatively say that there are rare unethical conducts of Directors 
observed since their employment and this constitute the popular opinion in this 
survey, 22 (22%) of the respondents strongly agree with the aforementioned 
assertion, 6 (6%) of the respondents disagree with the popular opinion in this survey, 
3 (3%) of the respondents strongly disagree with the popular opinion, while 3 are 
undecided on the issue.   
Table 3.17. Question 13: Do you think you have any obligation to report the 
appropriate authority any unethical conduct of the Directors? 
Responses  Number of Respondents  Percentage (%) 
Yes 90 90 
No 10 10 
Total 100 100 
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Source: Field Survey, 2020. 
Table 3.17 shows that 90 (90%) of the respondents answered in the affirmative, that 
they have an obligation to report the appropriate authority any unethical conduct of 
the Directors and which is the majority opinion, while 10 (10%) of the respondents 
answered in the negative.  
Table 3.18, Question 14: The Inter-personal relationship of employees with the 
customers will ensure customer satisfaction and lead to high productivity of the 
firm. 
Responses  Number of Respondents  Percentage (%) 
Agree 72 72 
Strongly Agree 18 18 
Disagree 0 0 
Strongly Disagree 0 0 
Undecided  10 10 
Total  100 100 
Source: Field Survey, 2020.  
Table 3.18 reveals that 72 (72%) of the respondents agree that the Inter-personal 
relationship of employees with the customers will ensure customer satisfaction and 
lead to high productivity of the firm and this constitutes the majority opinion, 18 
(18%) of the respondents strongly agree with the majority opinion in this survey, 
none of the respondents strongly agree nor strongly disagree in this survey while 10 
(10%) of the respondents are undecided.  
Table 3.19, Question 15: As an employee of this bank, the progress and high 
productivity of this bank is my utmost priority. 
Responses  Number of Respondents  Percentage (%) 
Agree 65 65 
Strongly Agree 23 23 
 Disagree 5 5 
Strongly Disagree 2 2 
Undecided  5 5 
Total  100 100 
Source: Field Survey, 2020.  
Table 3.19 reveals that 65 (65%) of the respondents agree that the progress and high 
productivity of the bank is their utmost priority and this constitutes the popular 
opinion in this survey, 23 (23%) of the respondents strongly agree with the popular 
opinion in this survey, 5(5 %) of the respondents disagree with the popular opinion 
in  this survey, 2 (2%) of the respondents strongly disagree with the popular opinion. 
While 5 (5%) of the respondents were undecided on the issue.  
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Table 3.20, Question 16: As an employee of this bank, I am under obligation to 
protect the interest of the management at the expense of any other interest.   
Respondents  Number of Respondents  Percentage (%)  
Agree 56 56 
Strongly Agree 28 28 
Disagree 0 0 
Strongly Disagree 5 5 
Undecided  11 11 
Total  100 100 
Source: Field Survey, 2020.  
Table 3.20 shows that 56 (56%) of the respondents agree that as an employee of the 
bank, he is under obligation to protect the interest of the management at the expense 
of any other interest and this creates the popular opinion in this survey, 8 (28%) of 
the respondents strongly agree that 28 (28%) with the majority opinion, none of the 
respondents disagree with the popular opinion, 5 (5%) of the respondents strongly 
disagree with the popular opinion wile 11 (11%) were undecided in the issue.  
 
3.21 Question 17: The concerted roles of the stakeholders of corporate 
governance in financial institution that is made of the management, 
shareholders, employees, customers and regulators of a financial institution, 
will ensure good corporate governance in a financial.  
Respondents  Number of Respondents  Percentage (%) 
Agree 18 18 
Strongly Agree 62 62 
Disagree 4 4 
Strongly Disagree 2 2 
Undecided  4 4 
Total 100 100 
Source: Field Survey, 2020.  
Table 3.21 reveals that 18 (18%) of the respondents agree that the concerted roles of 
the stakeholders of corporate governance in financial institution that is made of the 
management, shareholders, employees, customers and regulators of a financial 
institution, will ensure good corporate governance in a financial, 62 (62%) of the 
respondents strongly agree with the aforementioned assertion and which constitutes 
the majority opinion. 4 (4%), 2 (25) and 4 (4%) of the respondents were recorded 
Disagreed, Strongly Disagreed and Undecided, respectively.  
 
Table 3.22: Question 18: The concerted roles of the stakeholders of corporate 
governance in financial institution that is made of the management, 
shareholders, employees, customers and regulators of a financial institution, 
will not ensure good corporate governance in a financial institution. 
Respondents  Number of Respondents  Percentage (%) 
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Agree 25 25 
Strongly Agree 15 15 
Disagree 30 30 
Strongly Disagree 25 25 
Undecided  5 5 
Total 100 100 
Source: Field Survey, 2020.  
 
From Table 3.22, 25 (25%) of the respondents agree that  the concerted roles of the 
stakeholders of corporate governance in financial institution that is made of the 
management, shareholders, employees, customers and regulators of a financial 
institution, will not ensure good corporate governance in a financial, 15 (15%) of the 
respondents strongly agree with the aforementioned assertion. 30 (30%) of the 
respondents disagree that  the concerted roles of the stakeholders of corporate 
governance in financial institution that is made of the management, shareholders, 
employees, customers and regulators of a financial institution, will not ensure good 
corporate governance in a financial and this constitutes the majority opinion 25 
(25%) strong disagree with the aforementioned assertion while 5 (5%) of the 
respondents are undecided on the issue.  
 
Respondents: Verifiable Customers of the Financial Institution  
Table 4.1, Gender Distribution 
 
 Gender Distribution Frequency Percentage (%) 
Male 26 28.9 
Female  64 71.1 
Total 90 100 
Source: Field Survey, 2020.  
Table 4.1 shows that 26 (28.9%) of the respondents are male while 64 (71.1%) that 
constitutes the majority are female.  
Table 4.2: Education Qualification 
Education Qualification  Frequency  Percentage  
Cambridge  18 20 
HND 10 11.1 
BSC/LLB 52 57.8 
MSC 6 6.7 
Others 4 4.4 
Total  90 100 
Source: Field Survey, 2020.  
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Table 4.2 shows that 18 (20%) of the respondents are holders of Cambridge 
certificate, 10 (11.1%) are holders of HND certificate, 52 (57.8 %) are holder of 
BSC/LLB and constitutes the majority of the respondents, 6 (6.7%) are MSC 
holders, while 4 (4.4%), constitute those that are not within any of certificates 
provided.  
 Table 4.3: Age Distribution  
Age Distribution  Frequency  Percentage (%) 
21-35 42 46.7 
35-55 24 26.7 
55-60 14 15.5 
60-65 10 11.1 
Total 90 100 
Source, Field Survey, 2020.  
Table 4.3 reveals that 42 (36.7) of the respondents are within the age of 21-35 and 
this constitutes the majority of the age distribution in the research. 24 (26.7%) of the 
respondents are within the range of 35-55, 14 (15.5%) constitute those that within 
the age range of 55-60, while 10 (11.1%) of the respondents are within the age range 
of 60-65.  
Table 4.4, Number of Years as Customers  
Number of Years as 
Customers  
Frequency Percentage (%) 
Below 10 Years 26 28.9 
10-20 Years 46 51.1 
Above 20 Years 18 20 
Total 90 100 
Source: Field Survey, 2020.  
Table 4.4 shows that 26(28.9%) of the respondents are below 10 years as customers 
of the bank, 46 (51.1%) of the respondents are within the range of 10-20 years and 
this are this constitutes the majority in this survey, while 18 (20%) of the 
respondents are above 20 years as customers of the bank.  
Table 4.5. Question 1: Do you enjoy the service of this financial institution 
Response  Number of Respondents  Percentage (%) 
Yes 75 83.3 
No 15 16.7 
Total 90 100 
Source: Field Survey, 2020.  
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Table 4.5 shows that 75 (83.3%) of the respondents enjoy the services of the 
financial institution and which constitutes the majority, while 15 (16.7%) doesn’t 
enjoy the services.  
Table 4.6: Question 2: Have you had any cause to question the capabilities of 
this financial Institution to handle your financial transaction? 
Response  Number of Respondents  Percentage  
Yes 32 35.6 
No 58 64.4 
Total 90 100 
Source: Field Survey, 2020.  
Table 4.5 shows 32 (35.6 %) of the respondents answered in affirmative that they 
have had cause to doubt the financial institution in handling their financial 
transaction, while 58 (64.4%) constituting the majority, answered in the negative. 
 
Table 4.6, Question 3: Do you think that the Directors of this Financial 
Institution have put appropriate measures to protect your interest  
Response  Number of Respondents  Percentage (%) 
Yes 85 94.4 
No 5 5.6 
Total 90 100 
Source: Field Survey.  
From table 4.5, it can be deduced that the majority of the respondents constituting 85 
(94.4%) answered in the affirmative that the directors have put in measures to protect 
their interest, while 5 (5.6 %) of the respondent answered in the negative.  
Table 4.7 Question 4: Is there any provision made for customer’s feedback by 
the management of this financial institution? 
Response  Number of Respondents  Percentage (%) 
Yes 87 96.7 
No 3 3.3 
Total 90 100 
Source: Field Survey, 2020.  
It can be identified that Table 4.7 clearly shows that 87 (96.7%) answered in the 
affirmative that there is a provision made for customers feedback by the management 
of the financial institution and this creates the majority opinion in this survey, while 
minute 3 (3,3%) answered in the negative. 
Table 4.8 Question 5: Have you had cause to be in a state of apprehension of 
financial crisis of this financial institution due to mismanagement? 
Responses Number of Respondents  Percentage (%) 
Yes 13 14.4 
No 77 85.6 
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Total 90 100 
Source: Field Survey, 2020.  
Table 4.8 shows that 113 (14.4%) of the respondents affirmed that they have had 
cause to be in state of apprehension of financial crisis of the financial institution 
while 77 (85.6%) of the respondents answered in the negative to the aforementioned 
statement.  
Table 4.9, Question 6: As a Customer of this Financial Institution, I can 
authoritatively say that the services of this financial institution and the facilities 
are wonderful and in tune with modern financial innovations. 
Response  Number of Respondents  Percentage (%) 
Agree 30 33.3 
Strongly Agree 17 18.9 
Disagree 13 14.4 
Strongly Disagree 15 16.7 
Undecided  15 16.7 
Total 90 100 
Source: Field Survey, 2020. 
Table 4.9 shows that 30 (33.3%) of the respondents agree that the services of 
financial institution and the facilities are wonderful and in tune with modern 
financial innovations and this constitutes the majority opinion in this survey, 17 
(18.9%) strongly agree with the majority opinion. 13 (14.4%) of the respondents 
disagree with the majority opinion in this survey, 14 (16.7) also strongly disagree 
with the majority opinion while 15 (16.7%) of the respondents were undecided.  
 
Table 4.10, Question 7:  Is there any apt customer- staff relationship in this 
Financial Institution.  
Response  Number of Respondents  Percentage (%) 
Yes 79 87.8 
No 11 12.2 
Total 90 100 
Source: Field Survey, 2020. 
Table 4.10 reveals that 79 (87.8%) of the respondents answered in the affirmative 
that there is apt customer and staff relationship in the financial institution and this 
constitutes the majority opinion, while 11 (2.2%) of the respondents answered in the 
negative.  
Table 4.11, Question 8: As a customer of this financial institution can you say 
you are satisfied with the services of this bank. 
Responses  Number of Respondents  Percentage (%) 
Yes 63 70 
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No 27 30 
Total 100 100 
Source: Field Survey, 2020.  
Table 4.11 shows that 63(70 %) of the respondents answered in the affirmative that 
they are satisfied with the services of the bank and this constitutes the majority 
opinion in this survey, while 27 (30%) of the respondents answered in the negative.  
Table 4.12 Question 9: The Directors have put effective measures to ensure the 
protection of the deposits of the customers in this financial Institution 
Response  Number of Respondents  Percentage (%) 
Agree 17 18.9 
Strongly Agree 30 33.3 
 Disagree 15 16.7 
Strongly Disagree 13 14.4 
Undecided  15 16.7 
Total 100 100 
Source: Field Survey, 2020.  
Table 4.12 reveals that 17 (18.9%) of the respondents agree that the directors have 
put effective measures to ensure to ensure protection of deposits of customers in the 
financial institution, 30 (33.3%) of the respondents agree with the aforementioned 
opinion and this constitutes the majority opinion in this survey, 15 (16.7%) of the 
respondents disagree with the majority opinion in this survey, 13 (14.4%) of the 
respondents strongly disagree with the majority opinion in this survey, while 15 
(16.7%) of the respondents were recorded undecided.  
Table 4.13, Question 10:  The concerted roles of the stakeholders of corporate 
governance in financial institution that is made of the management, 
shareholders, employees, customers and regulators of a financial institution, 
will ensure good corporate governance in a financial.  
Response  Number of 
Respondents  
Percentage (%) 
Agree 30 33.3 
Strongly Agree 45 50 
Disagree 0 0 
Strongly Disagree 0 0 
Undecided  15 16.7 
Total  0 0 
Source: Field Survey, 2020.  
Table 4.13 reveals that 30 (33.3%) of the respondents agree that the concerted roles 
of the stakeholders of corporate governance in financial institution that is made of 
the management, shareholders, employees, customers and regulators of a financial 
institution, will ensure good corporate governance in a financial, 45(50%) of the 
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respondents strongly agree with the aforementioned assertion, which constitutes the 
majority opinion. None of the respondents neither agreed nor disagreed in the 
survey, while 15 (16.7%) were undecided. 
 
Table 4.14, Question 11: The concerted roles of the stakeholders of corporate 
governance in financial institution that is made of the management, 
shareholders, employees, customers and regulators of a financial institution, 
will not ensure good corporate governance in a financial. 
Responses  Number of Respondents  Percentage  
Agree 15 16.7 
Strongly Agree 10 11.1 
Disagree 35 38.9 
Strongly Disagree 25 27.8 
Undecided  5 5.6 
Total 90 100 
Source: Field Survey, 2020.  
Table 4.14 reveals that 15 (16.7%) of the respondents agree that the concerted roles 
of the stakeholders of corporate governance in financial institution that is made of 
the management, shareholders, employees, customers and regulators of a financial 
institution, will not ensure good corporate governance in a financial institution, 10% 
of the respondents strongly agree with the aforementioned assertion. 35 (38.9%) of 
the respondents disagree that  that the concerted roles of the stakeholders of 
corporate governance in financial institution that is made of the management, 
shareholders, employees, customers and regulators of a financial institution, will not  
ensure good corporate governance in a financial institution, and this constitutes the 
majority opinion, 25 (27.8%) of the respondents strongly disagree with the 
aforementioned assertion, which affirms the majority opinion, while 5 (5.6%) of the 
respondents were undecided on the issue.   
 
4.3 Test of Hypothesis 
In order to test the hypothesis in this survey, the researcher skilfully put the 
hypothesis in form of question in the questionnaires which were administered to the 
four stakeholders which have already been analyzed above.   
The hypothesis entails that:  
 
Ho1: The concerted roles of the stakeholders of corporate governance in financial 
institution that is made of the management, shareholders, employees, customers and 
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regulators of a financial institution, will ensure good corporate governance in a 
financial institution. 
Ho2: The concerted roles of the stakeholders of corporate governance in financial 
institution that is made of the management, shareholders, employees, customers and 
regulators of a financial institution, will not ensure good corporate governance in a 
financial institution 
However, in order to test the hypothesis above it is imperative to reproduce the 
majority opinion in of the Stakeholders, Directors, Staff and Customers as regards to 




 Table 5.1 The concerted roles of the stakeholders of corporate governance in 
financial institution that is made of the management, shareholders, employees, 
customers and regulators of a financial institution, will ensure good corporate 
governance in a financial.  
Responses Number of Respondents Percentage (%) 
Agree 20 66.7 
Strongly Agree 8 26.7 
Disagree 2 6.7 
Strongly Disagree 0 0 
Undecided  0 0 
Total 30 100 
Source: Field Survey, 2020.  
Table 2.34 shows that 20 (66,7%) of the respondents agree that the concerted roles of 
the stakeholders of corporate governance in financial institution that is made of the 
management, shareholders, employees, customers and regulators of a financial 
institution, will ensure good corporate governance in a financial and this constitutes 
the majority opinion in this survey, 8 (26.7%) of the respondents strongly agree with 
the popular opinion. 2 (6.7%) of the respondents disagree with the majority opinion. 
None neither strongly agreed nor disagreed with the popular opinion.  
Table 5.2, Question 31: The concerted roles of the stakeholders of corporate 
governance in financial institution that is made of the management, 
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shareholders, employees, customers and regulators of a financial institution, 
will not ensure good corporate governance in a financial institution. 
Responses  Number of Respondents  Percentage (%) 
Agree 12 40 
Strongly Agree 0 0 
Disagree 14 46.7 
Strongly Disagree 2 6.7 
Undecided  2 6.7 
Total 30 100 
Source: Field Survey. 2020.  
Table 2.35 reveals that 12 (40%) of the respondents agree that the concerted roles of 
the stakeholders of corporate governance in financial institution that is made of the 
management, shareholders, employees, customers and regulators of a financial 
institution, will not ensure good corporate governance in a financial institution, none 
of the respondents strongly agree with the aforementioned assertion, 14 (46.7%) of 
the respondents disagree that the concerted roles of the stakeholders of corporate 
governance in financial institution that is made of the management, shareholders, 
employees, customers and regulators of a financial institution, will not ensure good 
corporate governance in a financial institution and which constitutes the majority 
opinion, while 2 (6.7%) of the respondents strongly disagree with the 
aforementioned assertion and 2 (6,7%) were undecided on the issue .  
Table 5.3 Respondents: Directors 
The concerted roles of the stakeholders of corporate governance in financial 
institution that is made of the management, shareholders, employees, customers 
and regulators of a financial institution, will ensure good corporate governance 
in a financial.  
Responses Number of Respondents Percentage (%) 
Agree 20 66.7 
Strongly Agree 8 26.7 
Disagree 2 6.7 
Strongly Disagree 0 0 
Undecided  0 0 
Total 30 100 
Source: Field Survey, 2020.  
Table 2.34 shows that 20 (66,7%) of the respondents agree that the concerted roles of 
the stakeholders of corporate governance in financial institution that is made of the 
management, shareholders, employees, customers and regulators of a financial 
institution, will ensure good corporate governance in a financial and this constitutes 
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the majority opinion in this survey, 8 (26.7%) of the respondents strongly agree with 
the popular opinion. 2 (6.7%) of the respondents disagree with the majority opinion. 
None neither strongly agreed nor disagreed with the popular opinion.  
Table 2.35, Question 31: The concerted roles of the stakeholders of corporate 
governance in financial institution that is made of the management, 
shareholders, employees, customers and regulators of a financial institution, 
will not ensure good corporate governance in a financial institution. 
Responses  Number of Respondents  Percentage (%) 
Agree 12 40 
Strongly Agree 0 0 
Disagree 14 46.7 
Strongly Disagree 2 6.7 
Undecided  2 6.7 
Total 30 100 
Source: Field Survey. 2020.  
Table 2.35 reveals that 12 (40%) of the respondents agree that the concerted roles of 
the stakeholders of corporate governance in financial institution that is made of the 
management, shareholders, employees, customers and regulators of a financial 
institution, will not ensure good corporate governance in a financial institution, none 
of the respondents strongly agree with the aforementioned assertion, 14 (46.7%) of 
the respondents disagree that the concerted roles of the stakeholders of corporate 
governance in financial institution that is made of the management, shareholders, 
employees, customers and regulators of a financial institution, will not ensure good 
corporate governance in a financial institution and which constitutes the majority 
opinion, while 2 (6.7%) of the respondents strongly disagree with the 
aforementioned assertion and 2 (6,7%) were undecided on the issue .  
Table 5.3 Respondents: Staff of the Financial Institution.   
The concerted roles of the stakeholders of corporate governance in financial 
institution that is made of the management, shareholders, employees, customers 
and regulators of a financial institution, will ensure good corporate governance 
in a financial.  
Respondents  Number of Respondents  Percentage (%) 
Agree 18 18 
Strongly Agree 62 62 
Disagree 4 4 
Strongly Disagree 2 2 
Undecided  4 4 
Total 100 100 
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Source: Field Survey, 2020.  
Table 3.21 reveals that 18 (18%) of the respondents agree that the concerted roles of 
the stakeholders of corporate governance in financial institution that is made of the 
management, shareholders, employees, customers and regulators of a financial 
institution, will ensure good corporate governance in a financial, 62 (62%) of the 
respondents strongly agree with the aforementioned assertion and which constitutes 
the majority opinion. 4 (4%) , 2 (25) and 4 (4%) of the respondents were recorded  
Disagreed, Strongly Disagreed and undecided respectively.  
Table 3.22: Question 18: The concerted roles of the stakeholders of corporate 
governance in financial institution that is made of the management, 
shareholders, employees, customers and regulators of a financial institution, 
will not ensure good corporate governance in a financial institution. 
  
Respondents  Number of Respondents  Percentage (%) 
Agree 25 25 
Strongly Agree 15 15 
Disagree 30 30 
Strongly Disagree 25 25 
Undecided  5 5 
Total 100 100 
Source: Field Survey, 2020.  
From Table 3.22, 25 (25%) of the respondents agree that  the concerted roles of the 
stakeholders of corporate governance in financial institution that is made of the 
management, shareholders, employees, customers and regulators of a financial 
institution, will not ensure good corporate governance in a financial, 15 (15%) of the 
respondents strongly agree with the aforementioned assertion. 30 (30%) of the 
respondents disagree that  the concerted roles of the stakeholders of corporate 
governance in financial institution that is made of the management, shareholders, 
employees, customers and regulators of a financial institution, will not ensure good 
corporate governance in a financial and this constitutes the majority opinion 25 
(25%) strong disagree with the aforementioned assertion while 5 (5%) of the 
respondents are undecided on the issue.  
 
The concerted roles of the stakeholders of corporate governance in financial 
institution that is made of the management, shareholders, employees, customers 
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and regulators of a financial institution, will ensure good corporate governance 
in a financial.  
Response  Number of 
Respondents  
Percentage (%) 
Agree 30 33.3 
Strongly Agree 45 50 
Disagree 0 0 
Strongly Disagree 0 0 
Undecided  15 16.7 
Total  0 0 
Source: Field Survey, 2020.  
 Table 4.13 reveals that 30 (33.3%) of the respondents agree that the concerted roles 
of the stakeholders of corporate governance in financial institution that is made of 
the management, shareholders, employees, customers and regulators of a financial 
institution, will ensure good corporate governance in a financial, 45(50%) of the 
respondents strongly agree with the aforementioned assertion, which constitutes the 
majority opinion. None of the respondents neither agreed nor disagreed in the 
survey, while 15 (16.7%) were undecided.  
Table 4.14, Question 11: The concerted roles of the stakeholders of corporate 
governance in financial institution that is made of the management, 
shareholders, employees, customers and regulators of a financial institution, 
will not ensure good corporate governance in a financial  
Responses  Number of Respondents  Percentage  
Agree 15 16.7 
Strongly Agree 10 11.1 
Disagree 35 38.9 
Strongly Disagree 25 27.8 
Undecided  5 5.6 
Total 90 100 
Source: Field Survey, 2020.  
Table 4.14 reveals that 15 (16.7%) of the respondents agree that the concerted roles 
of the stakeholders of corporate governance in financial institution that is made of 
the management, shareholders, employees, customers and regulators of a financial 
institution, will not ensure good corporate governance in a financial institution, 10% 
of the respondents strongly agree with the aforementioned assertion. 35 (38.9%) of 
the respondents disagree that  that the concerted roles of the stakeholders of 
corporate governance in financial institution that is made of the management, 
shareholders, employees, customers and regulators of a financial institution, will not  
ensure good corporate governance in a financial institution, and this constitutes the 
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majority opinion, 25 (27.8%) of the respondents strongly disagree with the 
aforementioned assertion, which affirms the majority opinion, while 5 (5.6%) of the 
respondents were undecided on the issue 
Finally, in testing the hypothesis of this research, it shows from the above that 
majority opinion of the stakeholders in this research, concur that the concerted roles 
of the stakeholders of corporate governance in financial institution that is made of 
the management, shareholders, employees, customers and regulators of a financial 
institution, will ensure good corporate governance in a financial.  
 
4.4 Discussion of Findings 
It is important to reiterate that based on the finding above, that that the concerted 
roles of the stakeholders of corporate governance in financial institution that is made 
of the management, shareholders, employees, customers and regulators of a financial 
institution, will ensure good corporate governance in a financial. 
Firstly, the shareholders based on the field survey analyzed above, aptly understand 
their roles in ensuring good corporate governance in financial institution and 
mechanisms to put in place to maintain apt corporate governance. For instance in the 
survey, majority of the shareholders concurred with the following in all entirety: that 
there is need to put stringent policies and rules that will guide management of 
Financial Institutions, the Shareholders ought to put policies that will warrant the 
Management to always consult the Shareholders before taking critical Decisions,  
The Shareholders ought to always checkmate the actions and decisions of the 
Management, Shareholders should ensure adequate compensation of the board of 
directors to encourage them to make combined effort in increasing the productivity 
of the organization, Reviewing the day to day activities of the directors by the 
shareholders will make them accountable,  signing of a Conflict Interest form should 
be one of the criteria for appointment of directors, in order to checkmate the excesses 
of shareholders. Fundamentally, the shareholder totally disagreed in the survey, that 
the management and employees of a corporate entity should always be shareholders, 
in order to protect the investment of the shareholders, which is quite apt, because one 
doesn’t need to be a shareholder to do what is right and also, not only the interest of 
the shareholders that are protected, the interest of other stakeholders are protected 
also.    
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As regards to the directors, on whom the concept of corporate governance revolves, 
it can be deciphered from the survey, that  the directors of Allied Irish Bank, 
understands what corporate governance entails and  knows what ought to put in 
place in the financial institution to ensure good corporate governance of the 
institution. For instance, in the survey, the directors agreed to the following: the 
management of a financial institution requires finesse and is quite different from 
other organization because of the volatility of financial institution and the 
vulnerability of the customers, the sole decisions and actions of directors in a 
financial Institution either make or mar the financial institution, directors need to 
consult the stakeholders before taking any critical decision. Also, the directors also 
understand that customers of financial Institutions are vulnerable and needs to be 
protected by the management and there is no room for some unethical activities such 
as giving Loans to cronies without Collateral. It can be deciphered from the survey 
that directors totally agree that under performance of managerial duties is a stain on 
reputation and with the aforementioned knowledge, the directors will put in pertinent 
measure to safeguard their reputation by ensuring good governance.  
On the other polarity, there are certain facts revealed in the survey, as regards to 
directors that are quite disturbing. For instance, almost half of the directors opined 
that shareholders interest is the ultimate in corporate entity and which is not 
awesome an opinion , because there are other stakeholders involved in the corporate 
entity, for good corporate governance to thrive, Abdullahi and Valentine (2009) 
opined that all the stakeholders interest must be protected. Also, majority of the 
directors in the survey, all agreed that were the decisions of the board will affect 
shareholders differently, all shareholders should be treated equally, with due respect 
this perception of the board of directors is not apt, because there are different types 
of shareholders and the decisions shouldn’t affect them equally.  Also, majority of 
directors, concurred  that the Biggest Shareholders of this Financial Institutions can 
request or recommend his cronies for Loan beyond the legal limit and it will 
approved by the directors, the aforementioned perception is quite unethical.     
Progressively, as regards to the staff of the financial institution, the survey really 
reveals that the staff of the financial institution understand the feasibility of corporate 
governance and certain necessities that will enthrone apt corporate governance. For 
example, majority of the staff concurred with myriads facts such as:  that they have 
an obligation to ensure the smooth running of the corporation, the success and failure 
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of the organization depends on the interpersonal relationship between management 
and the staff, employee of this organisation are meant to engage themselves in in- 
service training, organised by the management, to keep themselves in tune with 
recent innovations in banking sector in order to serve the customers better. Also, 
most of the staff appreciate that there is need for assessment of individual 
performance of staff, which\ will boost the performance and operations of the firm.  
On the other polarity, there are certain facts that were largely concurred with in the 
survey that is not quite apt. For instance, that the employee allegiance is to the 
director and no ways and which practically means that most of the staff think that 
their allegiance only to the management and not to other stakeholder, which is not 
awesome. 
Fundamentally, the customers being of the stakeholders, practically understand how 
their feedback helps to structure and enthrone good corporate governance in the 
financial institution.  
Finally, the researcher had a virtual interview with a deputy director in Central Bank 
of Ireland as the regulators of banks in Ireland; the researcher understood through the 
interview that there are mechanism put in place to ensure good corporate governance 
in financial institutions in Ireland. Though the interviewee acknowledged the 
volatility of financial institutions and the vulnerability of its customers, she however 
regretted that most of these mechanisms haven’t been utilized by most banks.  The 
interview concluded that there is strict enforcement of corporate governance in 
Ireland and there is penalty for breach.   
4.5 Summary of Findings 
It is apposite that the researcher summarizes the findings, by using same to answer 
the research questions posed in this research. 
The first research question which is: what are the Roles of Board of Directors in 
guaranteeing good corporate governance in Financial Institutions? From the survey, 
it can be deciphered that the roles of board of directors in guaranteeing good 
corporate governance are legion and they are:  
i. Consulting stake holders before taking any critical decision  
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ii. Putting mechanism to protect the vulnerable customers of the financial 
institution  
iii. Reviewing the day to day activities of staff 
iv. Giving incentive to staff to encourage productivity  
v. Ensuring in-service training of staff to put them in tune with current 
innovations.  
Also, on the second research question, which is: What are the practicable ways 
Shareholders of Financial Institutions can ensure good Corporate Governance? Also, 
from the survey, the practicable ways shareholders can ensure good corporate 
governance are: 
i. Reviewing the actions and decisions of management 
ii.   Shareholders should ensure adequate compensation of the board of directors 
to encourage them to make combined effort in increasing the productivity of 
the organization 
iii.  Reviewing the day to day activities of the directors by the shareholders will 
make them accountable 
iv. Compelling directors to sign conflict Interest form before appointment.  
Progressively, the to the third research question, which is: What are the feasible 
ways Staff of Financial Institutions can aid in guaranteeing good Corporate 
Governance in Financial Institutions?  The survey equally provides myriads of ways, 
such as: 
i. Interpersonal relationship between the staff and the management  
ii. Reporting any unethical conduct of the Director  
iii. Having inter-personal relationship with the customers to ensure satisfaction 
that will lead to productivity.   
Notably, to the fourth question on how concept of corporate governance positively 
and negatively affects the customers of financial institution. It can be deciphered that 
the customers are vulnerable and need protection. However, the positive way good 
corporate governance affects customers is by providing a platform for feedback.  
Finally, the cogent mechanism that can be put in place to ensure adequate corporate 
governance by the regulators, is by making a corporate governance code and 




Having done an apt presentation and analysis, it is imperative to state that from the 
presentation and analysis, the stakeholder’s roles in ensuring apt corporate 
























Chapter Five  
5.1 Summary 
The role of Corporate Governance in Financial Institution is the fulcrum on which 
this research revolves.   
In chapter one of this research, the researcher considered some preliminaries, such as 
Background to the study, statement of the problem, research question, aim and 
objectives, scope and limitation of the research and synopsis of chapters. The basis 
of this chapter is to lay the foundation, for an apt understanding of this research.  
Chapter two of this research appraised some previous literatures in this area of study 
and aptly considered the conceptual, empirical and theoretical framework of this 
research. The rationale of this chapter is to identify the gaps in the previous 
literatures and evaluate how this research intends to fill the group.  
Furthermore, chapter three of this research deals with the research methodology, 
which aptly examines the methodology employed in this research. The gravamen of 
this chapter is to x-ray the methodology that will employ in this research.  
Nevertheless, chapter four of this research entails data presentation, analysis and 
summary of findings. The basis of the chapter is to evaluate the data collected from 
field and present the findings obtained.  
Finally, chapter five of this research generally summarizes this research.  
 5.2 Observations  
i. There is no apt mechanism put in place to ensure adequate corporate 
governance in financial institution   
ii. Most of the shareholders in financial institution do align with the 
management to defraud the corporate entity.  







5.3 Recommendations  
i. The Regulatory Authorities of financial institutions should endeavour to put 
in in potent mechanism and enforce same to ensure that adequate corporate 
governance is enthroned in financial institutions 
ii. There should be a neutral committee, especially in financial institution, set up 
by the shareholders to oversee the inter-personal relationship between the 
management and shareholders  
iii. The Management of financial institution should endeavour to put pertinent 
platforms for customer’s feedback, which is awesome for corporate 
governance.  
5.4 Contribution to Knowledge 
The research, just like any other research contributed to knowledge in myriads of 
ways.  
Firstly, the researcher aptly evaluated how concerted roles of stakeholders can 
enthrone good corporate governance in financial institution.  
Secondly, the researcher identified myriads of ways in which good corporate 
governance can be enthroned in a financial institution.  
Lastly, the research also contributed   to knowledge filling the gaps, observed in 
previous literatures. 
5.5 Suggested Area of Further Research 
The research is quite all-encompassing, but there is need for further research and 
some of the areas are:  
Firstly, there is need for further research on how stakeholders can ensure adequate 
corporate governance in financial institution. 
Secondly, there is need to examine how corporate governance affects the fortunes of 
a corporate entity. 
Furthermore, there is need to appraise the roles of board of directors and juxtapose 
same with the roles of shareholders in order to decipher how the two roles affect 
corporate governance.  
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Finally, there is still need for further research in corporate governance generally, in 
order to still appreciate the concept  
5.6 Conclusion   
Having buttressed pertinent points in this research, it is imperative to state that this 
research is all encompassing and quite novel.  
This research is novel in the sense that it considers the roles of the vital stakeholders 
in ensuring good corporate governance. The research did not rely on mere literatures 
but obtained verifiable data from the field and analyzed same.  
Finally, the researcher can conveniently posit that justice has not only been done to 
this research, but manifestly seen to be done. It is imperative to reiterate that the 
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